Q 1: News agencies reported the meeting between Musharraf and Vajpayee on 5/1/2004 on the sidelines of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit. The statements reported from them in the press conference on 6/1, and later by the Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh Rashid, all indicate a readiness to negotiate regarding Kashmir. Musharraf emphasized in his press conference that these negotiations are the "beginning of the end" for the conflict. Does this imply that the Kashmir issue has seriously become a subject for resolution? And what is the fate of the United Nations resolutions regarding Kashmir?
Answer 1:
The issue of Kashmir has been seriously placed on the table since Musharraf’s visit to America and Bush’s reception of him at Camp David on 24/6/2003. That visit was a turning point in the political and military action regarding Kashmir. Prior to that, no ruler in Pakistan dared to announce a solution for Kashmir through negotiations with India to partition it. Rather, it was clear in every political proposal that the entirety of Kashmir—both Azad Kashmir (with Pakistan) and Jammu and Kashmir (with India)—would become independent from India. India used to reject this, viewing Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of it, as stated in Nehru's 1956 declaration.
During that visit, Musharraf explicitly announced his approval of a Road Map for solving the Kashmir issue, similar to the Middle East. He added his readiness to provide significant concessions to reach a permanent solution with India. This offer (concession) was made during discussions with US representatives in Washington on 26/6 during the aforementioned visit. He further announced that he would stand against Muslim "extremists," referring to the groups fighting in Kashmir.
Since that date, Musharraf has been issuing law after law to prevent and obstruct any Muslim resistance against the Indian occupation of Kashmir. This continued until his recent meeting with Vajpayee on 5/1/2004 mentioned in the question, where the practical foundations for negotiating with India regarding Kashmir began to be laid.
Upon Vajpayee’s arrival in Islamabad on 4/1, he told Pakistani television that he was ready to hold talks with Musharraf and stressed the necessity of continuing the dialogue between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir. After the Musharraf-Vajpayee meeting on 5/1, Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh Rashid stated that the two leaders discussed the "thorny" issue of Kashmir during their hour-long meeting. Sources from both sides confirmed that they attempted to find common ground to start a dialogue. This is especially significant as Musharraf had indicated last December his intention to set aside UN resolutions regarding Kashmir as a gesture of goodwill for negotiations with India, because India had previously rejected those resolutions, which call for the right to self-determination for Kashmir.
It is well known that America was behind the UN resolutions for self-determination in Kashmir. Why has it abandoned them now and become keen on negotiations between India and Pakistan without the right to self-determination, which India always rejected and Pakistan accepted? There are two reasons for this:
First: America wants India to be the cornerstone in South Asia. Therefore, it provides it with military and economic aid to become a weight to counterbalance China, to be used if China threatens American interests in the region. Consequently, America wants to remove this "pain in India's side"—the Kashmir issue—so India can focus entirely on being a peer to China in the region.
Second: America fears the return of the Congress Party (loyal to the British) in India because its roots are deeper than the Janata Party and its coalition. Unless a strong public opinion is created in support of Vajpayee, giving him popularity that overrides or approaches the long-standing status of the Congress Party, American interests will remain threatened. The issue of Kashmir is as vital to the Hindus in India as it is to the Muslims in Pakistan. Solving this problem in a way that satisfies India—meaning without self-determination—will provide the ruling Janata Party with supportive public opinion. America previously supported Vajpayee during the Kargil incident in 1999 when it made Pakistan evacuate Kargil of Kashmiri fighters and the Pakistani army that supported them. Musharraf was the Chief of Staff at the time. Rescuing Vajpayee from that predicament had an impact on creating overwhelming popularity that led to his success in the elections following that incident.
Third: When the previous UN resolutions were issued, British influence was rampant in the Indian subcontinent. The policy of self-determination at that time was an American method to remove old colonialism. Today, both India and Pakistan have governments loyal to America. Resolving the conflict between them serves American interests by ensuring regional stability and the quiet implementation of American policy.
Therefore, it can be said that the Kashmir problem has begun to move toward a resolution in a serious manner between India and Pakistan, and the UN resolutions on self-determination are no longer a prerequisite for any solution, as Pakistan used to insist; Musharraf has declared his readiness to concede them.
Q 2: In his State of the Union address on 21/1/2004, the US President mentioned nothing about "peace" in the Middle East, which indicates that Bush is now concerned with the elections and the issues that affect them. The question now is: how should we understand the media reports that the Syrian President’s visit, which began on 8/1, was intended for Turkish mediation in negotiations between Syria and Israel, as well as in the relationship with America after the "Syria Accountability Act"? Does this not mean there is American interest in the Middle East?
Answer 2:
What you mentioned regarding Bush being occupied with the elections is correct. Whatever tips the scales in the elections is given importance and attention, and whatever does not is ignored during this election year. That is why you see him in the speech touching upon Iraq—because his army is there, and the repeated attacks on his army affect the voters. Therefore, he cares about it, trying as much as possible to reduce those attacks. The same applies to any issue based on its impact on the elections.
Accordingly, America is currently not actively interested in the Middle East crisis—neither the Palestinian nor the Syrian track—unless the crisis leads to the expectation of a war breaking out in the region. In that case, America would care because it does not want new "fires" while it is busy with elections and its army is exhausted in Afghanistan and Iraq. A war breaking out as a result of the Middle East crisis is unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future.
As for what the media circulated regarding Turkish mediation between Syria and Israel, and between Syria and America due to the "Syria Accountability Act," this was not the true objective of the visit. This is because negotiations between Syria and Israel do not require mediation; since the Madrid Conference, they have been ongoing between them openly, moving and stopping according to international political circumstances, or rather, American policy. In any case, they have only been interrupted in the declared sense. Secretly, however, they continue as circumstances dictate, as was revealed last week that secret talks took place between Syria and Israel a while ago and stopped only when news of them leaked.
As for the relationship between Syria and America, it is far from needing mediation. The path between America and Syria is open, and the Syria Accountability Act did not affect that. It is noteworthy that while the Act includes sanctions such as lowering the level of diplomatic representation, what happened was the opposite: America appointed a new ambassador to Damascus, Margaret Scobey, who presented her credentials to the Syrian Foreign Minister on 4/1. Similarly, Syria requested the US administration to raise the level of the Syrian Chargé d'Affaires in Washington to the rank of Ambassador. The US State Department approved this and submitted a report of approval to the White House late last month. The Syrian Chargé d'Affaires, Dr. Adel Mustafa, stated at the time that the channels of dialogue are still open between Damascus and Washington, as reported by Al-Hayat on 31/12/2003.
Thus, the purpose of the visit was not mediation; that was merely on the sidelines of the primary objective.
As for the real purpose: It was to send a serious and heated message to the Kurds of Iraq from neighboring countries that their insistence on an expanded federation—as they demand on a geographical and ethnic basis to be the nucleus of a future state—is a "red line" for these countries, and they will not tolerate its implementation. Strong coordination on this issue was evident among the three countries: Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi visited Damascus on 3/1 just before the Syrian President's visit and held talks on the subject with senior Syrian officials. Similarly, after the Syrian President's visit to Istanbul ended on 8/1, the Turkish Foreign Minister visited Tehran on 10/1 to convey what had occurred. Furthermore, the statements of Syrian and Turkish officials during the visit focused on the Iraq issue. Not only them, but the Saudi Foreign Minister also participated in the stance against the Kurds, stating on 6/1 that steps toward partitioning Iraq threaten Saudi security and all neighboring countries.
America worked to push these neighboring countries to heat up their stance toward the Kurds. This is because America had promised the Kurds a wide federation in their regions, and after the Iraq war, the Kurds tried to implement this. They insisted on the approval of the federation before any constitutional arrangements for Iraq, unless the constitution (whether temporary or permanent) stipulated a federation for the Kurdish region according to their specifications. Barzani stated on 29/12 that it was necessary to correct the agreement on the transfer of power signed between the Transitional Governing Council and America to include the rights of the Kurdish people by approving the federation of the Kurdish region. Moreover, they demanded the annexation of Kirkuk to the Kurdish region; Talabani stated on 8/1 that Kirkuk is a city located in the Kurdistan region, and they organized demonstrations and marches in Kirkuk that resulted in clashes with Arabs and Turkmen, leading to deaths and injuries. Kurdish voices then called for civil disobedience if the federation was not approved on an ethnic and geographical basis.
The Kurds acted on the basis of taking previous American promises seriously, but America saw the matter differently. It found that implementing the Kurdish federation as they wanted, and as it had promised them, would complicate problems and harm American interests in Iraq. Therefore, America pushed the neighboring countries—all of which are loyal to it—to send a message to the Kurds in the form of a warning that the neighbors would not allow a federation tailored to Kurdish measurements that would lead to quasi-independence in the future. In this way, it becomes easy for America to break its promises to the Kurds without appearing to have betrayed them or abandoned its word, by showing the reason to be the objection of neighboring countries and the conflict it would cause, harming the interests of both the Kurds and America.
This was the purpose of the visit. As for the accompanying bilateral talks, economic matters, and political mediations, they were merely on the sidelines of the aforementioned real purpose.
Q 3: It was announced in Moscow on 20/1/2004 that Secretary of State Colin Powell would arrive in the Russian capital this week. The US Embassy in Moscow stated that the Georgia file would be at the top of the visit's priorities, as Washington is demanding the Russians withdraw their military bases from Georgia. The new Georgian President, Saakashvili, had called on Moscow in his first statement after winning the elections to withdraw its forces from Georgia and not interfere in his country's internal affairs. Furthermore, the American Ambassador in Tbilisi stated on 19/1 that the US forces stationed in Georgia would remain there permanently. Does this mean that American influence has become completely dominant over Georgia, and that the Russian influence that existed via Shevardnadze has finally receded?
Answer 3:
First: American influence existed in Georgia during Shevardnadze's rule. The vanguard of American forces currently in Georgia arrived late last year before Shevardnadze was ousted. Additionally, there is an agreement signed during Shevardnadze's era allowing American spy planes to cross Georgian airspace. Shevardnadze himself, while laying the foundation stone for the new US embassy building in Tbilisi, revealed that he had requested American intervention to help him solve outstanding problems with separatists in Georgia. This is in addition to the American foreign aid that was being paid to Shevardnadze's government.
However, while Shevardnadze tried to get closer to Washington, he simultaneously tried not to anger Russia, given the influential factors Russia holds. Russia has two military bases in the south and west of the country inherited from the former Soviet Union. Russia also supplies Georgia with the largest portion of its energy needs via a gas pipeline, in addition to Russia's increasing influence in two of the separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Thus, Shevardnadze "held the stick in the middle," drawing closer to America while maintaining ties with Russia. He thought that by doing so, he would preserve his position through this balanced policy. But what Shevardnadze—a former Soviet intelligence officer—missed was that America does not accept entering through a half-open door. Its entry through it will not satisfy it until it opens it completely. Therefore, the "middle of the stick" policy accelerated his departure. The CIA worked to penetrate the political milieu through this half-open door, and then the military milieu, until it managed to build strong opposition in both, leading to the popular surge on 22/11/2003 that forced Shevardnadze to leave after the army was neutralized, exactly as happened in Iran during the ousting of the Shah.
Second: The centerpiece of the opposition, Mikhail Saakashvili, who came to power with a landslide victory of more than 95% of the votes, is known for his intense loyalty to America. He studied in the United States, was politically refined there, and his connection to America was famous and known to Shevardnadze himself. However, Shevardnadze did not expect that any political or popular action could oust him because he relied on the army. Furthermore, the "middle of the stick" policy made him refrain from crushing Saakashvili so as not to anger America. Consequently, his opponent was moving in plain sight. He felt confident that popular movements would not affect him as long as he relied on the army, but what Shevardnadze did not know was that senior army commanders had secretly linked themselves to America. This is what made the army abandon Shevardnadze, leading to his ousting.
Third: American influence in Georgia is currently strong, and there is nothing posing a danger except for Russia’s two military bases, which are now the subject of discussion. The first statement by the new Georgian president concerned them, as mentioned in the question. Not only that, but the US Secretary of State, who will visit Moscow, will discuss this matter with Russia on behalf of Georgia. Powell visited Georgia before his planned trip to Moscow, and talks between him and Saakashvili covered the security situation in Georgia and the future of Georgia's relations with Russia and Turkey. Bush had previously called Saakashvili to congratulate him on his election and invite him to visit America after taking the constitutional oath on 25/1/2004. In other words, it can be said that America has a firm grip on the situation in Georgia.
Fourth: As for the importance of Georgia, it is as follows:
- Georgia's geographical location between Russia and Turkey. Zeyno Baran, Director of International Security and Energy at the Nixon Center in Washington and an expert on Georgian affairs, was quoted as saying: "Georgia is of strategic importance because it is the meeting point between NATO and Russia."
- Although Georgia is not an oil-producing state—it doesn't possess much of it—it constitutes a transit route for oil from the rich fields of the Caspian Sea to international markets. It is well known that America pays great attention to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project, which passes through Georgia without crossing Russian territory.
- The agreement allowing American spy planes, launched from NATO bases in Turkey, to cross Georgian airspace to fly along the border with Russia. This agreement used to annoy the Russians because it posed a threat to their military units in southern and central Russia, particularly their forces in Chechnya. This agreement was one of the requirements of Shevardnadze’s "middle of the stick" policy, as the conclusion of the agreement during his era was balanced against the Russian bases. America knew that Shevardnadze agreed to the treaty for this purpose and that his oscillation between America and Russia might affect the stability of this agreement, which America considers vital to its interests.
For these reasons, America sees that Georgia has an importance to its interests that makes it worth the conflict.
Q 4: News agencies reported that on 8/1, a joint meeting took place between Turkish "military and civilians," during which they announced their determination to find a quick solution to the Cyprus issue and that they support the "good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General." They also discussed in the meeting "specifically the plan for the reunification of the island of Cyprus presented by Annan." The meeting included President Sezer, Prime Minister Erdogan, senior leaders from the National Security Council, and some division commanders.
The question: The approval of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government for the American plan is understandable, as the AKP government is loyal to America. But for the "military" to agree, this raises questions, especially since they were the ones behind the island's partition and the support for Denktash. Does this mean that just as America succeeded in bringing its agent Erdogan to power, it has also succeeded in penetrating the army and dominating it? If this is not correct, then how could the military agree to demolish what they built in Cyprus with their own hands?
Answer 4:
First: It is well known that the military establishment in Turkey follows the footsteps of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk). They are pro-British to the bone and consider themselves the guardians of secularism and Kemalism. America has tried to penetrate them more than once and failed. Its most important attempt was during the era of Ozal when he became President in 1983. Ozal was one of America's men and a brilliant politician. He saw that the military establishment was difficult to penetrate, so he did not waste his time on that. Instead, he aimed to create a parallel force; he turned toward the security forces, began training special units within them, and provided them with advanced weapons, some of which were sophisticated heavy weaponry. On the other hand, he carried the banner of "moderate Islam" (according to American specifications). The man followed the Naqshbandi tariqa, and Islamic sentiments were apparent in him. As a result, he built popularity, and his Motherland Party rose in the political milieu and gained public opinion because he appeared to the people—especially those in villages—to be standing on the side of the Islam they profess, in opposition to the secularism carried by the military men. He began to work with shrewdness with American help, and they almost succeeded in weakening the military's authority, but he died before the end of his presidential term. A veil was placed over the circumstances of his death, though news leaked that he was killed by the "hidden" forces—the products of the military.
Second: After that, the rule became unstable for any single party. Both British men and American men were working within the political milieu. The military began to reorganize the Motherland Party (Ozal's party); they brought Mesut Yilmaz to its leadership, and the party became loyal to the British because Mesut Yilmaz was one of their men. He proceeded to expel Ozal's group from the party. In response, the elements who were expelled from the Motherland Party for their loyalty to Ozal and America joined the Welfare Party (Refah) due to their Islamic leanings. They became a powerful influence within Erbakan's party, and America's weight increased within it even though Erbakan was one of the British men. This is what made the coalition government in the nineties—consisting of the True Path Party (Ciller), which was loyal to America, and the Welfare Party (Erbakan), which was influenced by the entry of Ozal's elements—appear as though it was being directed by America. The military feared America's return to grasping power as it had during Ozal's era. Therefore, the military intervened, ended the coalition government, and seized power. This happened on February 28, 1997, and this incident entered history as the "February 28 movement." One of its first actions was to target the Welfare Party; it dissolved it and reconstituted it as the Virtue Party (Fazilet) after expelling all of America's group, whether those who had joined from Ozal's party or those who were originally in it but followed America, such as Abdullah Gul and Erdogan. After the collapse of the coalition government, the military entrusted Bulent Ecevit with forming the government. He is one of the pillars of British policy in Turkey, and his wife is from the Donmeh Jews. He formed a coalition government with Mesut Yilmaz's party, the leader of the Motherland Party who had become aligned with the British. Thus, the military—the British group—returned to grasping power after the February 28 incident.
Third: It became clear to America that direct confrontation with the army was difficult. So, it saw another method: to work on marginalizing the army through "democracy" by bringing one of its men to power with a parliamentary majority so that he could legislate laws that limit the army's authority. This is exactly what happened; its choice fell on Erdogan and Gul, who were expelled from the Virtue Party after the February 28 incident. they began working within their circles and formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP) headed by Erdogan, who possesses characteristics similar to Ozal. Erdogan follows a Sufi tariqa, shows Islamic sentiments, and is one of America's loyal men; he has walked with them since his presidency of the Istanbul municipality. Despite being prosecuted by the military and harassed politically, he continued to be active in his loyalty to America and work in this direction.
Following that, the stage began to be set for Erdogan's arrival. America withdrew one billion dollars from the Turkish market, creating an economic shock. People's resentment began, especially as the purchasing power of the Lira dropped severely. During this, it managed to penetrate a small party that was in coalition with Yilmaz's party and Ecevit's party, which was the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) headed by Devlet Bahceli. It instructed him to demand early elections and to threaten resignation if elections were not held. Thus, early elections were held on 3/11/2002, and the AKP won a landslide victory that guaranteed it a parliamentary majority, allowing it to form the government alone. The opposition party facing it in parliament was a faction that split from Ecevit under the name "Republican People's Party (CHP) - Deniz Baykal," which is also a supporter of America. The other part of the party remained under Ecevit's leadership as the pro-British Democratic Left Party (DSP).
Fourth: Erdogan began implementing the drawn-up plan. Among his first actions was presenting a law to parliament to reduce the authority of the National Security Council to intervene in governance, as well as making the Council mixed with both military and civilian members. The army was distressed by this, to the extent that some news leaked that the Istanbul bombings late last year were orchestrated by the "military" to create security instability they could exploit to intervene, similar to the previous February movement. But they did not succeed. Thus, the army was left with no choice but to follow the path of British policy with America, appearing to agree with Erdogan's government in its policy while hiding its attempts to disrupt it whenever possible.
From this perspective, the military's approval of the Annan plan to reunify the island can be understood. It was not out of the military's satisfaction, but they had no other choice after political decisions became relatively removed from the army's jurisdiction and the government elected by the people (on a democratic basis) took over political decisions. This was also the case in Cyprus; the AKP government worked to ensure the success of Denktash's opponent, the pro-American leader of the Republican Turkish Party, Mehmet Ali Talat, who was tasked with forming the government.
However, this does not mean the complete exclusion of the military's control over governance. The army, having sat on the throne of power for decades, will not let this matter pass easily. It may create a violent conflict crisis with the government as an attempt to return to the forefront, especially since the majority of army leaders and division heads still maintain their loyalty to the path drawn by Ataturk—loyalty to the British, the preservation of secularism, and maintaining their grip on power.
Saturday, 2nd of Dhu al-Hijjah 1424 AH. 24/01/2004 CE.