Question:
Protests are still ongoing in Turkey, though not with the same momentum as in the early days after they erupted on May 31, 2013, in Taksim Square at "Gezi" Park. The protests began as a reaction to the uprooting of trees in the park to implement government plans aimed at converting an Ottoman-era barracks into a commercial and residential area. By the next day, the protests had spread to at least 67 cities. Clashes occurred between protesters and security forces who sought to end the demonstrations, resulting in several deaths and hundreds of injuries among both protesters and police. Hundreds were arrested, and arrests continue today in search of the instigators. What are the causes of these protests, who is behind them, and what are their objectives?
Furthermore, there is a striking matter: the lenient stance of the protesters toward President Abdullah Gul compared to their harsh stance toward Erdogan. This has made the protesters more satisfied with Abdullah Gul than with Erdogan. Does this mean that America is moving toward prioritizing Abdullah Gul over Erdogan in managing the country's affairs to absorb the protesters' anger? Is this expected in the future?
Answer:
To clarify the answer, we will review the following points:
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan accused internal and external forces and international media of igniting these events. He mobilized hundreds of thousands of his supporters in Kazlicesme Square in Istanbul on June 17, 2013, in response to the protests and to demonstrate public support. He attacked the European Union for its stance on the events. He was nervous and tense in his statements, cynical and aggressive; he described the protesters as a handful of looters and riffraff, claiming they follow the "interest rate lobby" and are tools exploited by foreign powers, among other accusations that increased the backlash and fueled anger against him. He did not expect such an event to occur; the events were a surprise to him, and he feared they might mirror the uprisings in the Arab world. This shook his reputation and the reputation of the "secular democratic model" that America promotes to the Arab world in his name.
As for the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, Bekir Bozdag, he also launched an attack and leveled accusations against the protesters and political opposition forces, saying: "Those participating in the Gezi Park protests are the same ones who participated in the 2007 protests and were calling for 'the army to perform its duty,' which is to carry out a coup. Most of them belong to the Republican People's Party (CHP), the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), and the Labor Party, and they use the mask of the left." He denied that the protests were a popular movement and stated that internal and external forces were behind them. He questioned how they could say they are against capitalism while they are funded by international capitalist institutions and work for them. He also mentioned that Alevis were addressed officially for the first time during his government's tenure, and that their religious manifestations and houses of worship were banned during the era of the Republican People's Party due to the application of (Kemalist) "Revolution Laws." (Radikal, June 21, 2013). He mentioned that those participating in these protests were among those who participated in the 2007 protests, but he did not mention that they had planned them with prior knowledge and deliberation. His accusation of all opposition parties with left-liberal and socialist orientations aimed to confine them to the official political opposition and strip them of their "popular" character. The Turkish Interior Minister, Muammer Guler, stated: "There is a will to push people into the streets through illegal acts such as work stoppages and strikes." He added: "It is impossible to understand the insistence on continuing the demonstrations." (AFP, June 17, 2013). This came after a trade union confederation, including two large central unions for workers and civil servants with hundreds of thousands of members, called for a general strike across Turkey to denounce the police violence against demonstrators. This means the Interior Minister believes there are forces that want the events to continue to exploit them for specific goals.
It appears the government seriously feared the escalation of events, which forced Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc to state: "The police will use all their power to end the protests, and if that is not enough, we can even use the Turkish Armed Forces in the cities." (Reuters, June 17, 2013). At the same time, Erdogan threatened the protesters, saying: "Our patience is running out, and I am warning you for the last time." (Official Turkish TV, June 13, 2013). The Hurriyet page reported on June 21, 2013, that Prime Minister Erdogan met with President Abdullah Gul, then met with Intelligence Chief Hakan Fidan, and subsequently held an emergency meeting with Chief of Staff Necdet Ozel—all on the same day, June 21, 2013—where he discussed the issue of the protests. This indicates his fear of long-term negative repercussions if they are not resolved finality; three weeks had passed without them stopping completely. The National Security Council is set to meet on June 25, 2013, to discuss confronting the protests.
Despite this, the stance of Turkish President Abdullah Gul was lenient, showing understanding, which brought him support. After praising "democracy" and considering it "the society's greatest wealth," Abdullah Gul expressed regret over the Taksim events, saying: "They have reached a worrying level, and we must all exercise maturity so that the protests can calm down." He mentioned that he "met this morning with the Prime Minister and other government and state officials and discussed the matter with them so that the calm can be restored in a manner befitting us." (Star newspaper, June 1, 2013). In this statement, he refers to the government and its head, effectively calling on the government and its leader to exercise maturity to calm the protests. It has been noted that after these events, Erdogan attempted to draw closer to the President after a recent period of estrangement. During his visit to the city of Kayseri on June 21, 2013, where his party organized a large mass rally to renew public support, he praised its people, saying: "Kayseri is the home of my brother Abdullah Gul." This was interpreted as an attempt at reconciliation with Abdullah Gul, whose statements were moving in a direction contrary to Erdogan's.
As for the Republican People's Party (CHP), it declared it had no connection to the events. CHP Deputy Erdal Aksunger emphasized that: "His party did not organize these demonstrations; rather, it is the Turkish youth who are calling for them because they are tired of Erdogan's decisions that encroach upon their personal freedoms." (Sky News Arabia, June 4, 2013). The CHP did not adopt the protests or lead them, and it prevented its flags from being raised there for fear of being held responsible for the violence, as its officials announced. However, it worked to exploit them for its benefit as an opposition party.
Regarding the American position, U.S. State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki stated: "The best way to ensure stability, security, and prosperity in Turkey is to support the freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, which these people were apparently exercising." She expressed "concern regarding the people injured in the protests." (Al Jazeera, June 1, 2013). The U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Francis Ricciardone, stated after visiting the headquarters of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Ankara: "Turkey is a friend and ally of the United States even in difficult times and crisis situations." He added: "There are no differences in democratic principles between Turkey and the United States." (Milliyet, June 20, 2013). Here, the Americans showed their support for Erdogan while claiming they support the freedom of expression and the formation of associations. However, the American newspaper The Christian Science Monitor commented on the events on June 4, 2013, saying: "The peaceful protests in Turkey against the increasing authoritarian rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamist-oriented party are corrective protests, not a revolution, and represent a brave, leaderless uprising to save democracy." The Americans wanted to contain any movement occurring in Turkey, as they have done elsewhere, so it does not escape their control. Thus, they adopt any democratic movement and criticize those who do not adhere to it—even if they are their own agents—to prove their leadership of the world and prevent situations from spiraling out of control, working to contain any opposition. This is especially true as there are groups and individuals in Turkey, including writers and journalists who support U.S. policy and were supporters of Erdogan, who have recently begun to criticize him and describe him as a dictator.
As for the European position, every European country without exception, led by Britain and its official media, the BBC (which Erdogan criticized by name), and all European media—even local ones unrelated to foreign policy news—followed the events with interest and took a stand against Erdogan and his government, supporting the protesters. The EU countries in Brussels announced their "deep concern over the excessive violence and violent intervention by the police against people demonstrating in a peaceful and legitimate manner, and warned Turkey against adopting harsh measures against peaceful protesters." (Turkish World News, June 20, 2013). Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu criticized the EU statement, saying: "When it is delivered to us, we will reject it immediately." (Same source). On June 21, 2013, Germany summoned the Turkish ambassador to demand clarifications on the Turkish police's suppression of protesters, a diplomatic expression of Germany standing with the protesters against the Turkish government. The German Chancellor described the suppression as very harsh, and Turkey reacted by summoning the German ambassador. Germany and the Netherlands opposed opening a new chapter in Turkey's EU accession negotiations because of this suppression and allowed demonstrations organized by Alevis in Germany. This indicates that Europe wanted to exploit the events and the Alevis against Turkey due to Turkey's alignment with U.S. policy and to justify its rejection of Turkey's EU membership by placing new obstacles before it.
The issue of the so-called Alevis emerged; most of them are involved in leftist, communist, liberal, democratic, or Kemalist organizations, as well as the Kemalist Republican People's Party (CHP), which is currently headed by one of them. They involve themselves in any movement opposed to Islam and seize opportunities to protest against anything related to Islam or the Ottoman State. They oppose naming the third suspension bridge—which the government is building over the Bosphorus—the "Sultan Selim I Bridge," under the pretext that this Sultan persecuted them when they revolted against the Islamic State. President Abdullah Gul alluded to this, saying: "He saw some sensitivity toward naming the third suspension bridge in Istanbul after Sultan Selim I," and indicated that "they (the state) will name some future projects in Turkey after Pir Sultan Abdal and Haci Bektas Veli, who are considered elders of the Alevi community." (Cihan News Agency, June 19, 2013). He tried to show a lenient stance toward the protest movements.
Fingers of suspicion were pointed by some toward Iran, suggesting it had a role in instigating the events, and the state began searching for Iranians accused of participating in fueling the unrest. There are Alevis who oppose Iran; the head of the "Turkish Turkmen Bektashi Alevi Association," Ozdemir Ozdemir, stated: "Iran has intensified its efforts, especially during the last three years, to cause sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Alevis in Turkey. He considered the Taksim demonstrations part of the events aimed at achieving this scenario." He said: "Tehran is implementing the sabotage plan through four Alevi associations in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir." (Cihan Agency, June 20, 2013). Erdogan alluded to this issue in his speech in Kayseri to his supporters, saying: "There are those who want to play a dangerous game with the Alevis. The CHP plays the primary role in driving this dirty game. The head of the CHP and some members of parliament belonging to this party are playing the lead role in this game. Also, some centers outside Turkey are taking a part in this dirty game." He mentioned that "there are those who want to sabotage the solution we reached to settle the Gezi Park events; they want to ignite the events and continue igniting them, and open fire on the police." He addressed the CHP and the leftists, stating they are stirring the situation and following terrorist, extremist, and outlaw movements (Milliyet, June 21, 2013). A leftist organization calling itself "RedHack" claimed responsibility for sending tweets on Twitter. The police are investigating the sending of 5 million tweets. Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc commented on this, saying "social media platforms are being used to encourage crime and violence, and deterrent measures will be taken." (UPI, June 20, 2013). There is an interest for Iran in exploiting these events; it connects with the Alevis and works to contain them just as it connects with other forces to draw them to its side to achieve its interests. However, this does not reach the level of playing a major role in toppling the Turkish government or taking serious action. Note that its relationship with the Turkish government has not deteriorated; relations between them are still ongoing and are not bad, and commercial ties are strong. Both Turkey and Iran revolve within the American orbit.
Criticism of Erdogan appeared from some groups considered "Islamic" that support U.S. policy. Their writers described Erdogan as self-admiring and said he should listen to advice—meaning from their group—and not be deceived by himself, while they praised Abdullah Gul as a humble democrat. It appears these groups—specifically one well-known group in the Turkish street, the "Fethullah Gulen movement"—want to preserve the significant interests they achieved under this government and want more. Their issue lies nowhere else. Two years ago, they sought to nominate individuals affiliated with or close to them on the electoral lists for the June 12, 2011 elections. When they did not achieve this, they began criticizing Erdogan's policy and even threatened to withdraw their support for the ruling party. Erdogan dismissed some security officials affiliated with them because he did not want this group to penetrate and control the state institutions further, putting him at their mercy and weakening his position, so he sought to clip their wings. This group is too small to have great political significance, even if it includes many individuals, because it is not a political movement and does not practice political work. Instead, it exploits political work and its support for parties to achieve its self-interests, such as material benefits and increasing its membership and reaching positions in state institutions. Nevertheless, Erdogan's party won those elections with a majority, reaching 50% of the votes. When the recent events occurred, this group and its leader displayed their criticism of the Prime Minister directly and indirectly, as if they were waiting for the opportunity for revenge. Erdogan told reporters during his visit to America last month that he "sent his deputy, Bulent Arinc, to the leader of this group who lives in America to meet with him to remove negative rumors being spread about the brotherly relationship and friendship between them, which dates back to the past." (Haber Aktuel, May 19, 2013). When asked whether he had lost hope in producing a new constitution, as Abdullah Gul had said, he replied: "I answer frankly, I too am losing hope." He said: "We want to open the door for discussion on the presidential system." He attacked the opposition, describing them as evading the discussion on this topic, and questioned: "Why are they afraid of this system, saying that a 'purge' will occur?" He said: "If this is not achieved, we have the draft constitution and we will resort to 'Plan C'," meaning relying on his party's votes and seeking some additional votes to complete the quorum. He said: "He needs 330 votes in parliament to go to a popular referendum on the constitution, but his party has 226 seats (meaning the required majority)," and expressed fear that his members might not vote for it because the voting would be secret. He mentioned that if the necessary number of votes is found, he would go to three elections in 2014: local elections, presidential elections, and a popular referendum on the constitution. It appears America is no longer very concerned with the constitutional amendment regarding the presidential system because it has now achieved what it dreamed of—control over the army leadership, while the presidency is in its hands, and the government and its leadership are in its hands, and it has begun to control the judiciary and other aspects of power and state institutions. Therefore, it does not put its weight behind it to achieve it, nor does it pressure its agents to stand behind it.
From all of this, it is clear that the protests erupted spontaneously and were then exploited by opponents of Erdogan who have different political orientations. It does not appear that there was prior planning or preparation. There are many who are lying in wait for Erdogan and seizing opportunities to work toward his downfall and take revenge on him, especially the followers of the "British group," who were harmed by the purges and the imprisonment of many of them. Additionally, there are people with secular orientations who have the illusion that Erdogan is "Islamist" and is working for the return of Islam, and they consider his secularism to be a type of hypocrisy and taqiyya (dissimulation) until he can consolidate power. These people do not understand Islam and think that the Erdogan government's permission for some religious manifestations confirms their claims. They do not realize that Erdogan fights the callers for the Khilafah and the implementation of Islam and only allows religiosity to the extent permitted by secularism.
These protests are unlikely to develop into a revolution that changes the system because the protesters belong to a small sector with a specific orientation. Half of the people support Erdogan, and half of the opposition is unlikely to walk with the protesters because they do not belong to the left; rather, they are an opposition to the left and are counted as the right according to democratic divisions. The leftist opposition parties did not adopt the protests or work to direct them but only worked to exploit them to gain votes. Thus, the protests remain confined to a narrow sector. These protests were media-inflated, especially by the European media and its followers. The Europeans' intent was to justify their opposition to Turkey's EU accession and obstruct the process. Additionally, the British work to exploit such movements to weaken Erdogan's position because he worked to purge their agents, imprisoned them, and removed them from the army leadership. Whatever the case, these events and the actions of Erdogan and his government toward them have shaken the reputation of the Turkish "secular democratic model," which Erdogan used to praise and promote to the Islamic world for America’s benefit and to please it, to prevent the return of Islam to governance. It has become clear that this is a false reputation and that this secular democratic system is an authoritarian system ready to crush its opponents. It should be noted that this system crushes the callers for the Khilafah and the implementation of Allah's law—those who carry the dawah intellectually and politically and never resort to violence—by throwing them into prisons and imposing heavy sentences on them, more than it imposes on those who practice violence in the streets and squares. However, local and international media practice a policy of blackout on this because it is not in their interest to highlight it, and because it relates to Islam, they deal with matters with a double standard. It does not appear that America has abandoned him, even if it showed some criticism to contain any movement that might arise and preserve its influence in the country; rather, it has expressed its support for him.
As for the claim that America is moving toward prioritizing Abdullah Gul over Erdogan in managing the country's affairs to absorb the protesters' anger, this is not correct. Rather, Erdogan implements its interests with a strength that Gul cannot match, even though both are loyal to America, and it uses each of them in the position appropriate for it. Furthermore, America's policy in handling protest issues tends toward severity—due to "American arrogance"—more than it tends toward leniency, unless things slip from its hand entirely, and the events have not yet reached this state. Therefore, the position of both Erdogan and Abdullah Gul is still appropriate for America's interests, at least for the foreseeable future. As for what is expected in the future, we will follow the matters, Allah willing, and if new developments with a different impact become clear to us, then every event will have its own discourse.
We ask Allah (swt) to manifest the truth in Turkey and nullify the falsehood, to grant victory to the dawah carriers, and to unite the hearts of the Ummah with them and through them, so that the Khilafah shines anew and returns to the land it bid farewell to more than ninety years ago. At that time, the influence of the colonialist disbelievers will end, and their agents will end with the end of that influence, and "Islambul" will return to enjoy the Khilafah once again, and that is not difficult for Allah.