Q&A: The Heated Conflict in Turkey Between the English Kemalist Secularists and American Liberal Secularists

Question:

What is currently happening in Turkey? Presidential elections in parliament followed by a popular vote, then parliamentary elections, significant movements within the army and government, statements and counter-statements, the Constitutional Court entering the fray, the President's approval and disapproval... What is the role of the American-British conflict in this matter? Does the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) have a role, especially given the bombings and other activities attributed to it during this turmoil, knowing that America was the one that established it? Finally, what are the power balances of the Turkish parties in the parliamentary elections next month?

Answer:

To clarify the picture, it is necessary to return to the history of the emergence of secular Turkey:

First: Since the criminal Mustafa Kemal implemented the plans of the English to destroy the Khilafah after World War I, he moved against Islam: its ideas and its sentiments. He followed a "secular" path that was more hateful toward Islam and Muslims than typical secularists. Furthermore, he and his clique were keen on making Turkey a pillar for Britain in the region. That is, he followed two lines that he made his methodology:

Fighting Islam and loyalty to Britain.

This continued until America emerged on the world stage after World War II, exploiting its victory to become the dominant superpower, replacing the previous colonizers (Britain and France) in their colonies. Consequently, American ambassadors in the Middle East met in Istanbul in 1950.

America tried hard to penetrate Turkey by infiltrating the army, which it saw as the effective force holding the reins of the country. However, it failed because the army was saturated with Mustafa Kemal’s (English) approach. Therefore, America saw that the only way was to resort to approaching the sentiments of the Muslims who were resentful of the army and the secularists. Thus, it was in the fifties with Adnan Menderes, and in the eighties with Ozal, and between them in the seventies and then the nineties with Demirel—though by the end of his era, he became proficient in the game of tug-of-war between America and the English. In any case, every time America’s agents crossed not just the red lines but even the yellow lines or approached them, America collided with a military coup against the government. Thus, the army carried out the coups of 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, their pretext each time being the preservation of the (English) secular system.

America learned something new from every coup. It became convinced of the impossibility of infiltrating the army, so during Ozal’s era, it tried to create a parallel force. Ozal began heavily arming the police. He had clear Islamic sentiments, being of the Naqshbandi tariqah, which made him popular among the general Muslim population. However, he was not satisfied with being Prime Minister in 1983; he became President in 1989. This is a sensitive position for the secularists and the army, and they do not accept anyone else reaching it. To make matters worse, at the beginning of his presidency, he received female students protesting their ban from university for wearing the khimar (headscarf) and sympathized with them... All of this accelerated the resentment of the secularists and the army.

Ozal had established the Motherland Party and gained public support because he appeared to the people, especially rural folk, as standing on the side of the Islam they believed in, in opposition to the secularism carried by the military. He worked with ingenuity with American help and almost succeeded in weakening the army’s authority by creating parallel military forces. However, he died or was killed in a conspiracy by the secularists, the products of the English, as some reports leaked at the time.

Second: After that, governance became unstable for any single party. The men of the English worked within the political sphere, as did the Americans. The army began reorganizing the Motherland Party (Ozal’s party), bringing Mesut Yılmaz to its leadership. The party became loyal to the English because Mesut Yılmaz was one of their men, and he expelled Ozal’s group from the party. In response, the elements expelled from the Motherland Party joined the Welfare Party (Refah) due to their loyalty to Ozal and America and their Islamic inclinations. They gained strong influence in Erbakan’s party, and the American side outweighed others in it, even though Erbakan was closer to the men of the English. This made the coalition government in the nineties—consisting of the True Path Party (Çiller), which was loyal to America, and the Welfare Party (Erbakan), influenced by Ozal’s elements—appear as if it were being directed by America. The army feared that America would return to holding power as it did during Ozal’s era. Therefore, the army intervened, ended the coalition government, and seized power. This occurred on February 28, 1997, and became known in history as the February 28 movement. One of its first actions was dissolving the Welfare Party. It was then reformed as the Virtue Party (Fazilet) after all of America’s group were expelled—both those who joined from Ozal’s party and those originally in it who followed America, such as Abdullah Gül and Erdoğan. After the collapse of the coalition government, the army entrusted Bülent Ecevit with forming the government. He was one of the pillars of English policy in Turkey, and his wife was of the Donmeh Jews. He formed a coalition government with Mesut Yılmaz’s Motherland Party, which had moved into the English orbit. Thus, the English secularists returned to power after the February 28 incident.

Third: It became clear to America that directly confronting the army was difficult and creating a parallel force was fraught with danger. So, it saw another method: to sideline the army through "democracy" by bringing one of its men to power with a parliamentary majority so they could legislate laws that limit the army’s authority. This is what happened. Its choice fell on Erdoğan and Gül, who had been expelled from the Virtue Party after the February 28 incident and had begun working within their circles. They formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP) headed by Erdoğan. He possesses qualities similar to Ozal; Erdoğan is of a Sufi tariqah and shows Islamic sentiments despite being a secularist. He is one of America’s loyal men, having walked with it since his presidency of the Istanbul municipality. Despite being prosecuted by the army because of a poem he recited and being harassed politically, he remained active in his loyalty to America and working in that direction.

Following this, the stage was set for Erdoğan’s arrival. America withdrew 5-7 billion dollars from the Turkish Central Bank in 2001. The economic privileges established during the Ozal period enabled America to carry out this operation easily, creating an economic shock. People began to grumble as the purchasing power of the Lira dropped significantly, and popular resentment against Ecevit and his government increased.

During this time, America managed to penetrate a small party that was in coalition with Yılmaz and Ecevit’s parties: the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) headed by Devlet Bahçeli. It prompted him to call for early elections and threaten to resign if they were not held. Thus, early elections were announced for November 3, 2002. When the English secularists could not postpone the elections, they moved the Cem Uzan business group—one of the financial pillars of the (English) secularists—to conduct an intensive negative campaign against the AKP. Uzan spent millions of dollars in a relatively short period. Nevertheless, the AKP won a landslide victory, especially since its campaign propaganda mixed secularism with a slight Islamic veneer. This small amount was enough to attract the votes of the general Muslim population because of the provocative hostility toward Islam shown by the military secularists and Kemalists. Thus, the AKP won and secured a parliamentary majority, forming the government alone. The opposition in parliament was a faction that split from Ecevit called the (Republican People’s Party - Deniz Baykal), while Ecevit’s party remained under the name of the Democratic Left Party. When Erdoğan came to power, he dealt a finishing blow to the Uzan group that had worked hard to prevent the AKP’s victory, accusing the group of corruption... and all their properties came under judicial scrutiny.

Fourth: Erdoğan began implementing the drawn-out plan to strengthen ties with America and weaken English influence, especially the army. One of his first actions was presenting a law to parliament to reduce the National Security Council's authority to intervene in governance and making the council mixed with both military and civilian members. The army was so disturbed by this that some reports leaked suggesting the Istanbul bombings in late 2003 were backed by the "military" to create security instability they could exploit to intervene, similar to the previous February movement, but they did not succeed. Then came the next step: the signing of the Shared Vision Document between the Turkish government and the US government, signed by Abdullah Gül and Rice on July 5, 2006. Its broad outlines, as appeared in the press statement published on July 5, 2006, on the official US State Department website, began with an introduction stating: "We share values and ideas regarding regional and global goals: the promotion of peace, democracy, freedoms, and prosperity." After the introduction, the broad outlines were mentioned, and we list the titles of those outlines here:

"The United States and Turkey pledge to work together on all of the following issues:

• Promoting peace and stability through democratic means in the Greater Middle East.
• Supporting global efforts to bring about a permanent solution to the Arab-‘Israeli’ conflict, and global efforts to bring about a permanent solution to the Palestinian-‘Israeli’ conflict based on a two-state solution.
• Supporting the development of stability, democracy, and prosperity in a unified Iraq.
• Supporting diplomatic efforts toward the Iranian nuclear program and (P5+1).
• Contributing to the establishment of stability, democracy, and prosperity in the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan.
• Supporting a final, integrated, comprehensive, and mutually satisfactory solution under UN auspices regarding the Cypriot issue, and ending the boycott imposed on Northern Turkish Cyprus.
• Raising the level of security around energy sources by diversifying sources and lines, including lines coming from the Caspian Sea.
• Strengthening relations with the Atlantic region (transatlantic) and changes in NATO.
• Fighting terrorism and its consequences, including the PKK.
• Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
• Prohibiting the smuggling of: people, weapons, and drugs.
• Raising the level of understanding, respect, and appreciation between and within religions and cultures.
• Developing and supporting ongoing, effective, and joint actions aimed at finding solutions to crises of common concern and international challenges."

Fifth: Regarding the PKK and its role with the army and the government:

1. The party was founded in 1979, but it actually emerged under American direction in 1984 during the era of Ozal (1983-1993), when it carried out its first operations against the army in Siirt (a Kurdish city in eastern Turkey). It was intended to pressure the army security-wise, simultaneous with Ozal’s military pressure on the army by creating (a heavily armed police force). This continued during Ozal’s era until its end, when the army confiscated the heavy weapons belonging to the security services.

The PKK’s situation continued this way—as a security weapon in America’s hand against the Turkish army—until late 1997 and early 1998, when two factors appeared:

First: The February 28, 1997, movement which returned Ecevit, England’s veteran man, to power as Prime Minister. He announced in his program the decisive elimination of the PKK.

Second: Turkish threats to Syria, declaring war on it by saying, "Syria is waging an undeclared war against Turkey by supporting the PKK." Turkey then announced it would respond to this undeclared Syrian war. One of Turkey’s generals stated: "We are capable of entering Syria from one side and exiting from the other." The issue became seriously tense. America decided: first, to keep Syria under its influence; second, realizing the failure of the security method in penetrating Turkey; and third, the necessity of changing this method to political work using concepts of democracy, freedom, and human rights in Turkey. It decided to strike a deal with the Turkish army through the new Turkish government—as the political and military authority in Turkey were now of the same kind—by abandoning the PKK as a (military) organization and ending the crisis with Syria. This was reflected in Syria, and de-escalation talks took place between Turkey and Syria, culminating in the signing of the Adana Agreement in October 1998. According to the agreement, Syria agreed to stop its support for the PKK, expel Abdullah Öcalan, and hand over a number of other leaders in Syria to Turkey.

Öcalan left Syria for Russia, which refused his asylum. He then left for Greece, then Italy, and finally settled in Kenya, where a unit of the Turkish Special Forces went and received him through an arrangement by American intelligence.

After that, America became active in political, popular, and democratic work... until it succeeded in bringing Erdoğan and his party to power in 2002, as we explained previously.

As for the PKK, it split: one faction followed the new American approach, i.e., political work under the leadership of Osman Öcalan. Another faction was seized by the English, most of whose leaders are of Jewish origin, and this faction came under the wing of the Turkish army. This faction is led by Zubair Aydar. It began to be used to create disturbances against Erdoğan’s pro-American government, while simultaneously providing a justification for the army to assert its presence whenever necessary under the pretext of eliminating disturbances. Thus, American policy regarding the PKK, especially during the AKP government, is for the Kurdish issue to be a political issue. Meanwhile, English policy regarding the PKK, especially during the AKP government, is for the Kurdish issue to be a security issue—the opposite of the situation before the Adana Agreement. This explains the armed actions currently being carried out by the English wing of the PKK.

Sixth: America, through the "democratic" actions carried out by the AKP, has been able to cross the red lines that the Kemalist secularists cannot tolerate.

The army, which considers itself the guardian of Kemalist secularism, holds the reins of the country through four matters in state institutions that it does not allow to be breached:

1. The Presidency: Although it is currently more of a moral symbol of the state, they consider it the "Atatürkist" coloring of the state.
2. The Constitutional Court: Through it, they hold the legal justification for military intervention and for invalidating laws they consider to violate the constitution according to their interests.
3. The Education Institution: It is important for them to control the culture of future generations.
4. The National Security Council: Through it, they hold the security justification for military intervention.

What happened is that the AKP government, using democratic methods and legislating laws in parliament, has managed to penetrate the Constitutional Court with two of its men currently. There are 11 judges in the court; two of them are not supporters of the army, and the government is continuing in this area.

Regarding the National Security Council, it managed to make it almost half military and half civilian.

It also tried, and is still trying, with the Council of Higher Education (YOK). Although it has not been able to penetrate it significantly yet, it is continuing to do so.

Until now, the AKP government was satisfied with working in the three previous areas, but today it has extended its reach to the presidency. This symbol is important and sensitive to the army, the guardians of the secular system. The government tried through democratic methods—as they have the majority in parliament—to bring Abdullah Gül to the presidency. However, the army considered this crossing the greatest of red lines and stood firmly against it, using threats and warnings alongside democratic methods... Therefore, it mobilized its crowds from everywhere to move secular public opinion. At the same time, it issued a statement in the name of the General Staff at 23:15 on the night of Friday, April 27, 2007—the day the Turkish parliament met for the first session to elect Abdullah Gül as president, which did not reach the two-thirds quorum, prompting the CHP to object and file a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court. The General Staff issued a statement carrying the character of a military memorandum (e-memo) on its official website. The statement was announced in a strange manner never seen before, as media circles were told to check the General Staff website. The most important points focused on in the statement were: "The problem that has emerged as a priority in recent days regarding the presidency centers on making secularism a subject of debate. This situation is viewed by the Turkish Armed Forces with grave concern. It must not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are the protectors of secularism and are against this debate and these negative observations. Therefore, the Turkish Armed Forces will clearly and plainly assert their weight and methodology at the appropriate time, and no one should doubt this." The final paragraph contained an explicit threat hinting at a military coup: "In conclusion, anyone who stands against the slogan 'How happy is the one who says I am a Turk,' which was drawn for us by the revered founder of the Republic, Atatürk, is an enemy of the Turkish Republic and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their unwavering determination (decision) to carry out their declared duties granted to them legally regarding the preservation of these characteristics (the characteristics of the Republic and the foundations upon which it stands), and their commitment and belief in this determination is absolute."

This statement acted as a confidence booster for secularists resentful of the AKP's presence in power, as they had been unable to do anything except observe. After the statement/memo was issued, the extent of the "arrogance" and power that pervaded secular circles became apparent.

Had it not been for America and the government charging the atmosphere with "democracy" and "rejection of coups," and exploiting the climate of EU negotiations, freedoms, and human rights... which helped create conditions that prevent or limit military coups, the army would have carried out a coup as usual in the past.

Realizing this, the government did not let the General Staff's statement pass quietly. Instead, at 15:00 on April 28, 2007, it issued a strongly worded press statement responding to the military statement/memo. Its press statement contained striking phrases such as: "The Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces is, from a legislative standpoint, under the command/authority of the Prime Minister," and the like. The government wanted to spoil the "arrogance" present in the army's statement and make it feel that its threat was moral rather than actual, as it no longer possessed the ability to carry out a military coup like in previous days. The government's statement also served as a message of restored dignity to the party's base, which had been shaken after the army's memo, suggesting that the government was still capable of standing firm. Nevertheless, the government realized that the Constitutional Court's decision would favor the army's request to invalidate the session, as the court is composed of men of the English except for two. Thus, the lawsuit filed by the CHP resulted in a court decision on May 1, 2007, invalidating the first round of presidential elections and establishing the requirement for the attendance of two-thirds of the deputies in each of the three electoral rounds.

Erdoğan and those around him initially stated they respected the Constitutional Court's decision, but after studying the reality and feeling the weight of the blow dealt to them, they showed their anger. Most notably, Erdoğan described the decision as "a bullet fired at democracy." This was not softened by Erdoğan’s later attempt to backtrack, claiming his statement was not directed at the court but at CHP leader Deniz Baykal, who was seeking to incite the court!

Despite this, Erdoğan did not "surrender." On May 1, following the announcement of the court's decision, he declared he would submit a draft resolution to parliament for the direct election of the President by the people, detailing it as follows:

• Making constitutional amendments to enable the people to elect the President directly, rather than through parliament as is currently the case.
• Changing the presidential term from a single seven-year term to two five-year terms.
• Making changes to general elections so they occur every four years instead of five.
• Lowering the age of eligibility for deputies to 25 years instead of 30.
• Reducing the number of deputies required for all parliamentary sessions, including the presidential election session, from two-thirds to a simple majority.

The most important articles among the constitutional reforms announced by Erdoğan were enabling the people to elect the President directly and lowering the quorum for parliamentary sessions from two-thirds to a simple majority.

Thus, Erdoğan submitted a project to parliament with these proposals. Since passing them in parliament requires two-thirds (367 deputies), and while the AKP has a majority it does not have two-thirds, they began seeking to secure this number. They turned to the Motherland Party, which has twenty deputies; with its agreement, the two-thirds would be secured.

The Motherland Party was the one founded by Ozal. However, after his killing, the army conducted a campaign to tear the party apart and get rid of its opposing elements, handing its leadership to Mesut Yılmaz, where loyalty was to the army (the English). When the party was defeated in the 2002 elections won by the AKP, Mesut Yılmaz resigned from the party leadership. After that, the Motherland Party entered a leadership crisis until it was headed by Erkan Mumcu, a famous former member of the Motherland Party during Mesut Yılmaz's era. He had resigned from it and entered the 2002 elections under the name of the AKP rather than the Motherland Party. Thus, he became a member of parliament for the AKP and subsequently held the position of Minister of Tourism. When the leadership crisis in the Motherland Party intensified, and based on negotiations with him, he resigned from the AKP and returned to the Motherland Party as its leader. Despite previously entering elections on AKP lists, he could not support the AKP in the vote for Gül’s presidency due to pressure from Mesut Yılmaz’s group in the Motherland Party because of this group’s English background. Had he done so with his twenty deputies, the two-thirds quorum for electing Gül would have been met.

Consequently, the circles that elected him when he ran on AKP lists became resentful and considered his act of not participating in the vote as a stab in the back. Since the parliamentary elections were approaching (July 22, 2007), he used his powers as party leader and convinced the party administration to vote in favor of the AKP’s project for direct presidential elections. This was done out of a desire to win in the upcoming elections and to appease the AKP supporters who had previously elected him. Thus, the AKP’s project to elect the President by the people won in parliament by securing the two-thirds quorum on May 10, 2007.

This was another attempt to harass the army and the English secularists, because the secular republic, since its establishment in Turkey, has not been able to market itself to the Muslim people who have never ceased rejecting its path. Despite using all kinds of severity and iron-fisted repression to make the people accept this system, and despite carrying out four military coups in nearly fifty years since the political opening after World War II, it has not been able to make the Muslim people embrace it in any way. For this reason, the army and the English secularists do not accept the President being elected by the people, nor those constitutional amendments being passed at this time. Therefore, they resorted to their last line of defense: the law passed by parliament with two-thirds needs Sezer's signature to be effective. It is known that Sezer, who became President in 2000, came from the Constitutional Court where he was its president. Thus, they expect him to exploit this signature power to the maximum extent: either to block the law or to amend it. Although the President only has the right to object twice, he has other means of obstruction, such as returning the matter to the Constitutional Court through legal arrangements that lawyers can "manipulate" to find loopholes. Or, if things get tight, the army may resort to the English wing of the PKK to create a security escalation that the army can exploit to declare a state of military emergency. This would affect the course of the popular presidential elections or return the matter to parliament if Erdoğan’s reform project fails... On the other hand, the efforts of the government and America will not let a legal opportunity pass by... This means the conflict is a heated one in which each team uses the maximum weapons at its disposal.

Seventh: After that, things proceeded as follows:

1. The parliamentary decision on reforms and direct election of the President was submitted to the President. He rejected it and returned it to parliament after fifteen days, the period allowed to him by law.
2. Parliament met on May 29, 2007, and re-approved the project for the second time, receiving 369 votes as the Motherland Party voted with it, thus gaining the required two-thirds majority for the second time.
3. The project was then returned to the President. Now, after this second time, the President cannot reject and return it. Instead, he must either approve it, resort to a referendum on it (using "convoluted" methods to ensure the referendum fails), seek a way out through the Constitutional Court, or create a military state of emergency by inciting military actions using the English wing of the PKK, particularly those who rely on Masoud Barzani in Iraq who has an English background.

Signs of military movements recently reported in the news appeared in this context. Bombings occurred in eastern Ankara on May 22, 2007, which the army attributed to the PKK, causing the deaths of seven people. Then, about 60,000 soldiers with heavy weapons including tanks were mobilized toward the border with Iraq (Kurdistan). The army exaggerated the matter to influence the atmosphere of the upcoming elections, especially by conducting military maneuvers in the neighboring Turkish province of Şırnak on June 7, 2007, using tank shells. However, the government’s position was to try to de-escalate to let the elections pass in a calm atmosphere. This means the army and the government are in a heated maneuver: the army is trying to escalate militarily and exaggerate the danger of the PKK to the state's existence, attempting to embarrass the government to provide political cover for a tense military situation. This would make the parliamentary and presidential elections less of a priority, leaving the current situation in the hands of the army. The government is trying to reduce the army’s fervor and downplay the PKK threat, while simultaneously trying not to appear indifferent to the country’s security. Meanwhile, America, on the other hand, insists on no Turkish military intervention in Kurdistan; furthermore, its planes crossed the Turkish border to monitor the Turkish army’s mobilization. Its position acted as a "deflator" for the Turkish army's military action, which made the Turkish Chief of General Staff, Yaşar Büyükanıt, resentful. He stated on May 31, 2007: "(Some allies) of our country are providing aid to Kurdish rebels in the Anatolia region," adding during a seminar in Istanbul: "Those who give us lessons in human rights are supporting 'terrorism'," as reported by Agence France-Presse and broadcast by NTV Turkish television. The US Secretary of Defense responded indirectly in a speech at a security conference in Singapore on June 3, 2007, warning the Turkish army against any military action on the Iraqi border.

It is expected that Sezer will try by all means possible for him and the army to block the law for popular presidential elections for the reasons mentioned earlier.

The crisis may remain in a state of push and pull until the parliamentary elections are held. If the AKP manages to win two-thirds, it can then elect the President in parliament. If it cannot get two-thirds, Turkey may continue for a period without (presidential) stability, and both sides may resort to a compromise:

• The army gives up imposing the president it wants.
• The government gives up electing the president from the people.

This solution would only be a sedative. The army will not easily accept not appointing the president it wants. Since a coup is currently difficult, it may fabricate military actions to influence the course of events.

Likewise, the government will not let an opportunity pass without benefiting from it.

This means reaching a political crisis is expected unless the AKP alone obtains two-thirds in the upcoming parliamentary elections on July 22.

Eighth: The balance of power in the upcoming elections is as follows:

It is likely that three parties will be able to enter parliament, i.e., obtain the required 10% or more: the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican People's Party (CHP), and the Democratic Party (DP), which was formed by the union of the True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP).

As for the AKP, it will win the majority and might get two-thirds if it can portray itself as "oppressed" and that the English secularists did not allow it to elect the President with its parliamentary majority, and that Sezer refused to sign the popular election law despite its two-thirds approval, and so on... in addition to the political and economic actions with which America supports it... Then, if it can manage its exposure before the Islamic circles that elected it the first time—since it became clear to them that the AKP did not achieve anything Islamic, not even removing the ban on the khimar... I say, if it can master these tactics, it may win two-thirds. However, what has recently appeared—the removal of those with Islamic tendencies from the candidate lists to please secularists—will affect the party's winning percentage.

The CHP will not face a problem in crossing the 10% threshold. However, the number of seats it can secure will depend on its ability to build an electoral alliance (as the army wants) with the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and other leftist parties, returning the party to what it was before Deniz Baykal's split from Ecevit. The obstacle to this is Rahşan Ecevit (Bülent Ecevit's wife and moral leader of the DSP), but it is likely she aims to delay the agreement rather than prevent it. Her goal is to move public opinion toward the DSP for publicity and to bargain with the CHP from a position of strength regarding the distribution of seats. Although the CHP agreed to give the DSP twenty parliamentary seats, there are sixty party officials in the DSP aspiring to be deputies! In any case, if the army can reunite the two split wings, their chances will be relatively high, and it will be at the expense of the two-thirds the AKP hopes to gain.

As for the new union of the True Path and Motherland parties under the name of the Democratic Party—a name they chose from Adnan Menderes’s old party as a dramatic tactic to tickle people’s sentiments—this union will likely not go beyond an electoral alliance. It is more like parties formed for temporary occasions. This union is expected to cross the required threshold. This is if the union remains standing (cracks have recently appeared in this union at its start; if the cracks become a separation, the chance of each party individually will significantly weaken).

Then come other less likely parties:

The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP): It is expected to reach the threshold and be the fourth party to enter parliament if it can utilize the PKK operations to stir nationalist and patriotic sentiments; otherwise, it may not reach the threshold.

The Kurdish party called the Democratic Society Party (DTP): It is unlikely to reach the required percentage because its supporters and voters do not exceed 7% according to experts. Because it realizes this, it is trying to participate through independent candidates.

The Great Unity Party (BBP) and Erbakan's party, the Felicity Party (Saadet), which address the Islamic milieu: unless they form an alliance, it is unlikely either will obtain the required percentage.

It is worth mentioning that any new military, security, economic, or political developments will change the data mentioned above.

Whatever the case, the English Kemalist secularists and the American secularists who coat their secularism with Islamic "touches" are all currently in a whirlpool of actual conflict. This is the nature of countries controlled by a military authority and a political authority with different loyalties. Such countries face two types of political crises:

1. The crisis of coalition governments: In this case, the crisis is either between coalition partners due to differences, or a lack of understanding between the coalition government and the army. if it is between partners and cannot be avoided, the government falls, and the crisis ends with a new government or early elections. If it is between the coalition government and the army and cannot be avoided, a coup or military intervention occurs, as happened in the "white" military coup on February 28, 1997, and the preceding coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980.

2. The crisis of a single-party government: In this case, either the ruling party has an internal crisis resulting in a split, or the crisis is between the single-party government and the army. If it is internal, it ends by resolving negative factors or a party split where the stronger faction forms a new government or calls for elections. If it is between the single-party government and the army, this is one of the most dangerous crises, accompanied by an intense conflict leading to a military coup unless local and international pressures prevent it. This is the current crisis between the AKP government and the army and its followers. This crisis will continue to react intensely until a new power balance emerges or the current one is consolidated according to the army's ability to maneuver militarily to create emergency conditions, or the government's ability to exploit international circumstances to thwart them.

Summary:

1. What is occurring is a heated conflict between English Kemalist secularists—led by the army to keep the presidency in their hands, regain control over the National Security Council, and prevent the breach of the Constitutional Court—and American secularists who wrap their secularism in Islamic veneer to attract the Muslim public (due to the provocative hostility of English secularists toward Islam). This is to weaken the army's (English) control over the levers of power in Turkey, continue expanding government intervention in the National Security Council, and find even narrow paths into the English "fortress" in the army, while increasing the government's men in the Constitutional Court and removing the army's control over the presidency.

2. The PKK is split into two wings: an English wing exploited by the army to heat up the security atmosphere when the army needs to create a military emergency after being politically cornered by the government, turning the issue into a military matter—as is happening now with the mobilization toward the Iraqi border. The second wing is with America, and its current broad line is for the issue to remain political, consistent with the American path for the government.

3. The issue of the state presidency will likely remain pending until after the early parliamentary elections on July 22, 2007, and the presidential election issue will be decided based on their results.

22 Jumada al-Ula 1428 AH 08/06/2007 CE