Question:
It is well known that Yanukovych is Russia's man in Ukraine and is currently the President of Ukraine. Naturally, his orientation should be toward Russia. However, it is observed that his positions are soft toward Europe and America. Does this mean he has begun to shift toward the West and away from Russia, or is this in agreement with Russia to preserve his rule against the interventions and pressures he is facing?
Answer:
To understand the answer, one must grasp the international reality concerning Ukraine. Ukraine is a center of an old conflict between Russia and Europe, and in the modern era, America has entered the arena of conflict. This dispute, especially between Russia and Europe, has left a profound impact on the people of Ukraine and their outlook toward the West and Russia. People living in the east of the country are loyal to Russia, while those residing in the west are influenced by Europe and America; consequently, the country is effectively divided into two parts. Furthermore, the political elite in Ukraine has worked over the years to balance relations between European powers and Russia, or to bias toward the dominant power, whether it be Europe or Russia.
Thus, Ukraine is important to these countries for the following reasons:
As for Russia: Ukraine is one of the most vital countries for it. If Russia loses Ukraine, the West becomes directly on its borders; it serves as a protective shield from the direction of Europe, aside from its economic importance as Russian gas pipelines pass through it to the West. It is noteworthy that Russia insists on restoring its hegemony over the Soviet Union region, of which Ukraine was a part. However, with the outbreak of the so-called Orange Revolution and the success of Yushchenko in reaching power in the 2005 elections, Russia's influence in Ukraine weakened. Yushchenko was an American agent, and America exploited his term to accelerate Ukraine's integration with the West. Throughout his time in office, Yushchenko threatened to expel the Russian Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol upon the expiration of the Russian military lease there in 2017. Yushchenko did not hide his desire to fully integrate Ukraine into Western institutions such as the European Union and NATO. Kyiv entered negotiations for an Association Agreement with the EU and demanded a Membership Action Plan for NATO. Thus, Russia's influence was in a predicament. However, in February 2010, Russia managed to return its man in Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, to power. He is the country's fourth president and a strong supporter of Russia. Since then, American influence began to recede, and Ukraine moved toward normalizing relations with Russia.
President Yanukovych met with Russian President Medvedev in Kharkiv less than two months after taking office, on April 21, 2010. In the meeting, he agreed to extend the Black Sea Fleet lease for an additional 25 years, ending in 2042. In return, the Russian company Gazprom agreed to reduce the price of natural gas to $100 per 1,000 cubic meters for the remainder of the gas contract signed in 2009. Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko objected to the agreements, stating they contradicted the constitution, and due to her strong opposition, she was imprisoned.
Although Ukraine under Yanukovych expressed a desire to maintain cooperative relations with NATO, his government did not demand NATO membership or a Membership Action Plan. With these policies, the bilateral agenda between Kyiv and Moscow became in favor of Russia.
On the internal front, Yanukovych's policies became increasingly authoritarian. On September 30, 2010, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine overturned the constitutional amendments approved by the Ukrainian Parliament in December 2004. This occurred after judges who opposed the decision were dismissed and replaced by four new pro-decision judges. This allows Yanukovych to return to the pre-Orange Revolution days, giving the president powerful influence and weakening the authority of the Parliament.
As for Europe: It realizes that Russia exploits the gas card and the supply to the West through Ukraine, using it for pressure and enticement to keep Ukraine under Russian influence, or at least not loyal to the West at Russia's expense. Therefore, Europe tries to entice Ukraine with money and alternative solutions to its complete dependence on Russian gas. The European Union offered Ukraine funds to upgrade gas infrastructure and technology and to participate in the exploitation of shale gas. There has been talk of making gas the energy hub. Against this background, Ukraine and the EU signed a protocol to join energy treaties in September 2010, which entered into force in February 2011. Earlier this year, Ukraine also signed a $10 billion contract with Shell to exploit shale gas reserves in Ukraine, intended to be one of the largest partnerships in Europe. It is believed it will be one of the largest contracts for extracting underground natural gas from shale for the next fifty years in Europe.
Ukraine is currently negotiating with the European Union regarding integration, but the Party of Regions (Yanukovych's party) is hindering these efforts. The Head of the EU Delegation to Ukraine, Jan Tombinski, urged members of the Party of Regions to stop obstructing the work of the Parliamentary Committee on European Integration. Such developments disturb Russia. To counter the EU's economic incentives as part of the integration talks, Russia offered Ukraine membership in the Customs Union. As a result of Russian pressure and Yanukovych's loyalty to Russia, the Ukrainian Parliament ratified the (Russian) Free Trade Zone agreement on July 30, 2012. Ukraine became the third country after Russia and Belarus to ratify this agreement, which was established on October 18, 2011, and initially signed by eight CIS countries led by Russia, along with Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Tajikistan. Russia and Belarus ratified it first, followed by Ukraine, with other countries' ratifications following.
Nevertheless, just as Yanukovych is subject to Russian pressure, he is also subject to pressure from the European Union, which refuses for Ukraine to join the Customs Union with Russia or further integrate with Russia. Therefore, the European Union informed Ukraine at their recent summit on March 25, 2013, in Brussels, that it is impossible to combine membership in the European Union and the Customs Union. The EU had facilitated Ukraine's accession to the World Trade Organization, and Peter Mandelson, the EU Trade Commissioner, stated on January 14, 2013: "The EU is a strong supporter of Ukraine's membership in the WTO, and this is the first step toward greater integration of Ukraine with the global and European economy."
Thus, it seems clear that while Yanukovych is loyal to Russia, he also tries to move closer to the European Union; that is, he is playing on the chord of balancing Russian and European interests in Ukraine.
As for America: The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a new opportunity for old European powers, as well as for America as a global superpower, to exercise greater influence on the political stage in Ukraine. Because Europe was preoccupied with the reunification of Germany, the unification of the currency in Europe, and internal disputes among European countries, America was given the opportunity to exploit the situation to the fullest. Russia was in no way able to stop America, as it was completely collapsed following the fall of the Soviet Union and the transition to capitalism. America exploited Russia's weakness; former President George H.W. Bush signed the Freedom Support Act (FSA) on October 24, 1992—Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act—to enable a unified American approach in providing aid to Eurasian countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia in the State Department (EUR/ACE) was tasked with coordinating and managing the foreign aid programs authorized by the FSA.
Under the FSA, successive U.S. governments sought to increase their influence in Ukraine. For example, after Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, America was able to use Ukraine's first president (Leonid Kravchuk) to establish the Trilateral Process in 1994 to eliminate nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil. America was also able to establish a strategic partnership with Ukraine through the second president (Leonid Kuchma) in 1994. Kuchma also concluded a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU and agreed to a distinctive partnership with NATO. America was even able to influence the bilateral treaty between Russia and Ukraine in May 1997 regarding the rights of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Crimean Peninsula. America succeeded even more in Ukraine when President Viktor Yushchenko came to power in the 2005 elections following the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko was an American agent, and America used his tenure to accelerate Ukraine's integration with the West. Throughout his time in office, Yushchenko threatened to expel the Russian Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol after the Russian military lease expired there in 2017. Yushchenko did not hide his desire to fully integrate Ukraine into institutions such as the EU and NATO. Kyiv entered negotiations for an Association Agreement with the EU and demanded a Membership Action Plan for NATO, but these efforts failed when Russia's man, Yanukovych, came to power.
Nevertheless, America has continued to pressure Ukraine not to join the Russian Customs Union and urges it to join the European Union, because that brings it into the Western sphere and paves the way for Ukraine's future entry into NATO. Consequently, this clears the path for American hegemony over it, limits Russian influence there, and creates a belt around Russia from the Eastern European side.
America focuses on winning over Ukraine militarily by involving it in military maneuvers, with the ultimate goal of bringing it into NATO. NATO maneuvers were conducted in the Black Sea on July 14, 2010, and continued until July 26, 2010, with Ukraine's participation. This was only a few months after Yanukovych's election and at the height of his good relations with Russia. Although Russia protested through its Foreign Ministry in a statement saying: "The nature of these maneuvers and the attempt to present them as anti-Russian and the participation of countries not from the region raise questions and some concern. Likewise, Ukraine's policy aimed at accelerating its accession to the Atlantic Alliance does not contribute to strengthening good neighborly relations." (Iranian Radio website, July 19, 2010). Similarly, joint American-Ukrainian naval maneuvers took place on June 13, 2011, for the Ukrainian Navy in the Black Sea. Russia also "expressed its dissatisfaction in a statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry and considered this step a direct threat to its national security." (Al-Arabiya, June 12, 2011).
We understand from all this that Yanukovych has not severed his link to Russia or his loyalty to it, but he cannot fulfill all its demands due to internal and external pressures and his desire to succeed in the 2015 elections. Russia realizes this; it is better for it that Yanukovych remains than for those loyal to the West to come to power, as they would work to move away from Russia toward the West, thereby endangering Russian interests. However, Yanukovych will not go so far in his relations with the West as to end his loyalty to Russia, especially since Yanukovych's popular base consists of supporters of the pro-Russia orientation, so he cannot ignore that. But he will continue to work on pleasing the West, opening up to it, and achieving his interests with it. Russia understands this; it does not tighten its grip too much on Yanukovych, nor does it loosen the rope to the point that he slips from their hands.