Question:
On August 15, 2017, the Taliban movement sent an open letter to the American President calling on him to withdraw American forces from Afghanistan rather than sending more troops: ("The Taliban movement called on US President Donald Trump to 'completely withdraw his forces' from Afghanistan, and warned him in an open letter against increasing the number of American troops in this country that has proven difficult for Washington...") (Source: Novosti - RT - Russia Today, August 15, 2017). This was in response to Trump's intended new strategy in Afghanistan, which the Taliban fears will include sending new troops, as statements from White House officials have escalated regarding the imminence of this new strategy. The aforementioned site reported on August 10, 2017, Trump telling reporters: ("His administration is 'very close' to adopting a new strategy for Afghanistan..."), adding: ("It's a very big decision for me. I inherited a mess, and we're looking to make it much less of a mess.") Does all this mean that America is serious about establishing a new strategy in Afghanistan? Will it include sending new troops or activating the Pakistani or Indian role in Afghanistan without sending new American troops? May Allah reward you with goodness.
Answer:
Yes, it can be said that America today is conducting a vigorous review of its strategy in Afghanistan, perhaps seeking what might guide it to what it calls the "final stage" of its intervention in Afghanistan. Trump is angry with the military leadership in Afghanistan; Reuters reported on August 3, 2017, news of a stormy meeting between American President Trump and military officials in Washington: ("Intense tension arose during the meeting when Trump said that Defense Secretary James Mattis and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford should consider firing General John Nicholson, commander of US forces in Afghanistan, because he did not win the war.") Thus, Trump is expressing doubts about the American war in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration also reviewed and modified the American strategy for Afghanistan, the review being conducted by the Trump administration today has a particularity, as it takes place in a circumstance where America's international problems and its standing in the world are worsening. This can be detailed as follows:
First: America declared its war on Afghanistan in late 2001 under the pretext of responding to the September 11 attacks, driven by the Neo-Conservatives who surrounded the George W. Bush administration. Less than two years later, America attacked and occupied Iraq, sinking into its sands and beginning to seek a way out. With America mired in Iraq, its war in Afghanistan became less significant. It focused its efforts on exiting the Iraqi quagmire after Iraq and the Iraqi resistance became the primary concern for the Bush administration and later the Obama administration. With the Obama administration's success in withdrawing the bulk of American combat troops from Iraq in late 2011, America began building a new strategy to deal with the rise of China; this issue dominated the second term of the Obama administration. Before the features of this American strategy were complete—indeed, while it was being prepared and formulated—America found its influence in the Arab region shaken by the "Arab Spring" revolutions, especially in Syria. Consequently, America began distributing its efforts between combating the dangers of revolutions in the Arab region, particularly Syria, and against China in the Far East, showing its rejection of the Chinese islands, working to revive Japanese militarism, and pursuing a path of provocation against North Korea. Given this reality, and because American losses in Afghanistan were of a moderate type, Afghanistan and America's war there moved away from the center of American attention, though this does not mean total neglect as much as it reveals the fact that new priorities took precedence.
Second: During the long years of war (16 years) in Afghanistan, it can be asserted that the American and NATO armies participating in the war have failed miserably to uproot the Afghan resistance, represented primarily by the Taliban movement, which was removed from power in 2001 by American intervention. It can also be asserted that all American options for stabilizing its puppet agents in Afghanistan have also failed. India, which America brought into Afghanistan to help stop what it calls the "insurgency," has not been effective. The war waged by its agents in Pakistan on Waziristan and elsewhere to try to mitigate American losses in Afghanistan has not helped much, and reconciliation efforts with the Taliban have not progressed. Therefore, the American situation in Afghanistan looks extremely grim after 16 years of war. The Taliban movement moves with great freedom in vast areas of Afghanistan, and the puppet government in Kabul has no influence over them. The movement launches powerful and terrifying attacks in most Afghan regions, including the capital, Kabul, where the US military has failed to impose security. In fact, many attacks against US forces originated from members of the Afghan army trained by Washington. Thus, American options in Afghanistan have narrowed.
In describing the today's Afghan reality and its risks, a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on May 22, 2017, states: ("The resulting combination of a weak Afghan regime and an unchecked Taliban resurgence could lead to a catastrophic collapse of the Afghan regime and government, leading either to a return to chaos or a renewal of terrorist groups.") The report emphasizes that the Afghan conflict must be ended, not only because it costs America $23 billion annually, but because of the narrowness of the options proposed for a solution.
Despite the withdrawal of many American troops from Afghanistan during President Obama's rule—leaving only about 10,000 soldiers, supported by 3,000 NATO soldiers, as well as 20,000 personnel from American security companies—that withdrawal was never the result of any victory or progress. The Taliban would quickly occupy bases vacated by the US military, and the puppet Afghan government army does not seem to operate effectively outside the capital, Kabul, despite its large numbers and extensive American training efforts. This is from a military perspective.
Third: From a political perspective, after America realized the narrowness of its options in Afghanistan and the bankruptcy of the "Indian option," it resorted to negotiating with the Taliban movement in the hope of integrating it into the American-led rule in Afghanistan. It used its agents in power in Pakistan to drag Taliban leaders to negotiations. However, all those attempts failed. America has not succeeded militarily or politically regarding Afghanistan; rather, America lacks a specific plan for this issue, becoming a target of criticism for this deficiency. (Interfax news agency quoted a source in the Russian Foreign Ministry on Thursday, August 3, 2017, saying that the inability of President Donald Trump's administration to put forward a clear policy toward Afghanistan constitutes an additional factor of ambiguity and instability in this country, adding that the stability of the Afghan state and the positions of NATO member states regarding their military presence there, and the prospects for settling the situation in the country in general, depend on this.) (Russia Today, August 3, 2017).
Fourth: This clarifies the depth of the American crisis in Afghanistan and the narrowness of its options. However, America is in dire need of cooling down the Afghan war, if ending it entirely is not possible, to stop the hemorrhage of its military and economic energies. Some military leaders see a need to increase American forces to achieve victory over the Taliban, but the President stipulates for accepting this a relatively short timeframe and clear, tangible results—something the military cannot provide given their bitter experiences in Afghanistan over 16 years. What makes this option theoretically viable is Trump's salivation over the vast mineral wealth in Afghanistan, which America estimates at one trillion dollars, in addition to its location as a corridor for oil from Central Asia. The Al-Dustour newspaper website on July 26, 2017, quoting The New York Times, reported: ("It added that to explore the possibilities, the White House is considering sending an envoy to Kabul to meet with mining officials there, noting that at a time when the White House entered into an increasingly stubborn debate over Afghanistan policy last week, three of Trump's senior aides met with Michael N. Silver, an executive at American Elements, a chemicals company, to discuss the possibility of extracting rare earth minerals there.") However, the option of sending more troops and investing in infrastructure in Afghanistan, such as railways and roads, to make the extraction of those minerals possible, is not a safe option even from the perspective of the commercial deals that dominate the President's mindset, given that these potential mines are located in territories controlled by the Taliban movement.
Accordingly, the option that the Trump administration is likely to take is to withdraw the American army into military bases in Afghanistan to preserve the puppet government and prevent its collapse, while giving a big push to Pakistan and returning it to Afghanistan after the failure of the Indian role. All of this is to persuade the Taliban movement to integrate into the American political system in Kabul and end the Afghan revolution—i.e., ending America's longest war. Thus, America hopes to strongly reduce the costs of its war in Afghanistan by shifting its presence to military bases that move upon danger, making them similar to its bases in the Gulf region. This is in addition to the help of its agents in Pakistan, whose ties with the Taliban movement have not been severed; it is possible to revitalize them and build trust until the Taliban accepts American conditions through the Pakistani gateway. America has previously used its agents in Pakistan successfully during the Obama era: ("The Afghan government reached an agreement with Hezb-e-Islami, the second largest militant group in the country, in the absence of the group's leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Representatives of the armed group signed the agreement with the president, Ashraf Ghani.") (BBC, September 22, 2016). This is what encourages America to use Pakistan regarding the Taliban, especially considering Hekmatyar after the reconciliation and his return to Kabul, where he called on the Taliban movement to integrate into the political system: ("The leader of Hezb-e-Islami in Afghanistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, called on the Taliban movement to join the reconciliation with the Afghan government. In his first public speech after arriving in Kabul, he urged the movement to help in the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country through peaceful means.") (Al Jazeera Net, May 6, 2017).
Fifth: It appears that America, in the face of the major risks it faces in the China basin—especially the situation that is heating up day by day with North Korea—the continuing risks in Syria, as well as the failure of all American policies in achieving a real economic recovery, on one hand; and on the other hand, due to the exhaustion of the American army in Afghanistan, the despair of achieving victory, the bankruptcy of the Indian role on the local Afghan level, and the hope that emerged with Hekmatyar's return—it appears from all this that America hopes to achieve a reconciliation in its own way that guarantees what it could not achieve through war. Therefore, it decided to return to activating the Pakistani role in Afghanistan and easing Pakistani attacks, whether internally or on the border with Afghanistan. During the era of the new military leadership headed by Bajwa for about eight months, the Pakistani arena has been free of large operations like those his predecessor Raheel Sharif was famous for, such as the "Zarb-e-Azb" operations in its various stages against those Raheel called "terrorists" on the border with Afghanistan. Rather, light clashes have been heard between the Pakistani and Indian armies on the Kashmiri border during General Bajwa's leadership. This undoubtedly enhances his acceptance internally and among Taliban leaders.
Similarly, the new Pakistani army chief, Bajwa, sought to extend a hand of cooperation to Afghanistan under the title of "combating ISIS," i.e., re-centering the concept of the "War on Terror" from fighting the Taliban movement and the Mujahideen in Waziristan toward ISIS. This direction includes the Afghan government and the Pakistani tribes resentful of his predecessor Raheel, while more remains hidden in his (Bajwa's) talks with the Afghan Taliban: ("The commander of the Pakistani army, Qamar Javed Bajwa, extended a hand of 'security cooperation' with Afghanistan to face the threat of ISIS, in a rare development of bilateral relations between the two neighboring countries. General Bajwa's quest to start security cooperation with Afghanistan came during a meeting on Friday with a number of tribal leaders in the Kurram Valley—an administrative division located in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan—near the Afghan border. In a rare development for bilateral relations with Kabul, the Pakistani army commander called on everyone in the two countries to 'unite and be vigilant.' He continued during his meeting with the tribes of Kurram Valley: 'We must be united, ready, and vigilant against this threat...'") (Al-Khaleej Online, July 1, 2017).
What confirms that America has been unable to bypass the Afghan Mujahideen, especially the Taliban, are the conciliatory statements of the Afghan President after the Trump summit in Saudi Arabia. He said: ("What is more important is that the Afghan government wants reconciliation, and we hope the 'Taliban' will choose; if they choose peace, they will get everything they want through politics and law, and we hope the 'Taliban' will distance themselves from the terrorists.") (Asharq Al-Awsat, May 25, 2017). This confirms that American policy wants to delude the Taliban movement into thinking it is outside the scope of the American war on "terror"; rather, it should align with the Afghan government in this war. Furthermore, the Taliban's demands for the complete withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan can be achieved through peace and not war.
Sixth: In conclusion, President Trump's strategy in Afghanistan is being reviewed at a time when American policy faces immense risks around the world. In light of the facts mentioned above, the American review of its policy in Afghanistan is likely to include the following matters:
This review moves toward a significant cooling of the Afghan arena, restricting the American presence to military bases to be used upon danger, and framing its mission as being against "ISIS"...
It is unlikely that America will send military forces for the purpose of fighting and escalating it. It might send troops for a short period, but not for the purpose of fighting, but rather as a negotiating bargaining chip—as if America says, "We can 'concede' by withdrawing these additional forces in exchange for the Taliban 'conceding' and accepting negotiations to establish a joint rule with the Afghan government," and naturally without infringing on America's interests.
To facilitate tempting the Taliban to accept, America will return to activating the Pakistani role by having the new military leadership in Pakistan show more leniency and sympathy toward the Taliban to push them to sit and negotiate with the puppet government in Kabul and include them in the American political system in Afghanistan.
Seventh: Finally, we warn against relying on the agents in Pakistan or being reassured by the leniency shown by their military leadership toward Afghanistan. It is obligatory to learn from the past; America would not have been able to set foot in Afghanistan if not for the help of its agents in the Pakistani government. This new policy from the Pakistani government toward the Taliban is nothing but a play woven by America itself to tighten the drama, whose only goal is to remove the dangers facing its puppet rule in Afghanistan without its costly military intervention, or with very little of it. The new rulers of Pakistan are but another, exposed face of that American plan. At times, America asks its followers in Pakistan to tighten the noose on the Afghan Jihad and break its strength, as the infamous Raheel did in Waziristan according to Obama's plan. Now, the new men in government are working to tempt the Taliban and contain them according to Trump's plan, after America's policies failed to push them by force to the table of destruction, "negotiations," as a way to uproot their determination for Jihad. Thus, they are trying to push them to negotiations through Pakistani rapprochement by way of deception and trickery. We warn against falling into the traps of America and its agents, or relying on them:
وَلَا تَرْكَنُوا إِلَى الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا فَتَمَسَّكُمُ النَّارُ وَمَا لَكُم مِّن دُونِ اللَّهِ مِنْ أَوْلِيَاءَ ثُمَّ لَا تُنصَرُونَ
"And do not incline toward those who do wrong, lest you be touched by the Fire, and you would not have other than Allah any protectors; then you would not be helped." (QS. Hud [11]: 113)
On the twenty-fourth of Dhu al-Qi'dah 1438 AH Corresponding to August 16, 2017 CE