Question:
On 2018/12/18, France 24 published: "Clashes broke out in the city of Hodeidah in Yemen between government-aligned forces and the Houthis just minutes after the start of a UN-brokered truce... France 24, 2018/12/18"... On 2018/12/17, Sputnik Arabic reported: "A member of the 'Ansar Allah' delegation stated regarding the Sweden Agreement that it did not include the handover of Hodeidah port or the withdrawal of Houthis from the city. In response, Yemeni Information Minister Muammar al-Iryani stated that these remarks constitute a coup against the agreement itself before the ink has even dried, emphasizing that the agreement stipulated the withdrawal of militias from Hodeidah and its ports: Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa"...
The question is: How can there be such a dispute over the text of the agreement before the ink has even dried? And how can clashes break out minutes after its commencement? Furthermore, why is there American and British welcoming of the agreement? Is the Yemeni tragedy expected to end with this agreement? May Allah reward you with goodness.
Answer:
Before delving into the subject of the Sweden Agreement—whose talks began on Thursday, 2018/12/06, and ended with a superficial handshake on 2018/12/13—we must first summarize the situation in Yemen as follows:
First: After the Houthis seized Sana'a, effectively expelled the Hadi government from the capital, and took control of most of Yemen, they became in dire need of a type of "legitimacy" to bestow upon their rule. America was attempting to grant them that "legitimacy." However, this was not easy, as the political medium in Yemen is largely loyal to the British. Therefore, America’s greatest ambition was to have the Houthis accepted as an active part of Yemen’s political map. The Houthis are a small group in northern Yemen, particularly in Sa'dah, and lack popular acceptance. Thus, America worked to support the Houthis to become an influential element in Yemen so that no government could persist without them. This was done through the following steps:
- It involved Saudi Arabia in "Operation Decisive Storm" through aerial operations, not to eliminate the Houthis—otherwise, it would have deployed ground forces—but to make the Houthis appear as the defenders of Yemen against warplanes. This portrayed them as victims and heroes simultaneously, helping them gain popular acceptance and favorable public opinion.
- It made Hadi, the British-aligned Yemeni president, essentially a prisoner in Saudi Arabia, making it easy to pressure him whenever its plans required.
- It influenced the Security Council to send envoys to Yemen who were loyal to it, succeeding with Jamal Benomar and Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed.
As for Britain, which has held influence in Yemen for decades, it knows that the Southern Movement (al-Hirak) and the Houthis in the north are tools for America to penetrate its dominant influence in Yemen. With the Houthis entering Sana'a and the rest of Yemen and receiving significant Iranian military support, Britain saw its influence in Yemen begin to shake, especially after the Saudi role. Consequently, Britain rushed to counter America's plans and tools:
a) Highlighting an Emirati role to balance the Saudi role. Indeed, the UAE played a decisive role in reclaiming Aden and other southern regions from the Houthis. Through this role, it created a southern movement that neutralized American agents within al-Hirak, making their role secondary and securing the south. b) It involved its long-time agent Ali Saleh in the north with the Houthis, placing him by their side so the British would have a role with the Houthis if they gained prominence. He almost succeeded in his mission before they assassinated him. c) It worked hard to send a UN envoy loyal to it, succeeding in the appointment of the British Martin Griffiths as the new international envoy to Yemen.
Second: Britain knew that what sustained the Houthis was Iranian support. After the closure of Sana'a airport and the control of southern ports, the port of Hodeidah became almost the sole artery for Iran to deliver support to the Houthis. Therefore, the UAE moved toward Hodeidah to seize it. These movements and battles around Hodeidah were met with significant American rejection under humanitarian pretexts, claiming that Hodeidah port provides aid to millions of Yemenis—as if America has any regard for humanity, which it and its agents trampled upon in Syria under UN auspices with suffocating sieges and barrel bombs. However, America wanted to find justifications to keep Hodeidah port open for Iranian military support, which for a year or more has included ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis at Saudi Arabia, as well as drones launched at targets in the UAE. In contrast, Saudi Arabia maneuvered its aircraft without actually striking the Houthis' vital points; for example, Houthi forces besiege Taiz and their military positions are exposed to aerial surveillance, yet the siege remains. As for the UAE, it was actually fighting the Houthis and almost expelled them from Hodeidah were it not for American pressure exerted through Saudi Arabia.
Thus, America’s plans and tools did not align with Britain’s plans and tools. America leaned toward a political settlement after ensuring Houthi control over important parts of Yemen. Meanwhile, Britain was waiting for more Houthi defeats so they would accept a withdrawal—meaning a return to the Sa'dah square—before going to an actual political settlement. Therefore, all previous negotiations were nothing more than political "games" to pass time, and thus those rounds failed, such as the Kuwait negotiations and the Geneva negotiations in early September, where the Houthi delegation did not arrive. The negotiations failed while the Houthis faced great risks as UAE-backed forces reached the outskirts of Hodeidah and its port. During this time, the most prominent role was that of the UAE, which mobilized local militias for the Hodeidah battles. Saudi Arabia was in an embarrassing position where it could not reject this Emirati move since they were ostensibly "allies" in the Yemen war against the declared target, the Houthis. Because America prohibited the attack on Hodeidah, the UAE—and Britain behind it—chose a timing when America was preoccupied with something more important. The battles for Hodeidah ignited on June 8 and 9, 2018 (Al-Hurra, 2018/6/10), at a time when America was heavily involved in preparing for Trump's summit with the North Korean leader in Singapore on 2018/6/12. This timing was chosen when America was nearly paralyzed from stopping the attack. Indeed, the Security Council failed to stop the Hodeidah battles (Al Jazeera Net, 2018/6/15). Consequently, the Hodeidah battles and the possibility of the UAE and its militias seizing the port became the greatest threat to Houthi rule, prompting the Houthis to mobilize all their strength and America to mobilize its officials to weep over the humanitarian situation. Over the past months, the intermittent battles around Hodeidah became the most dangerous part of the war, especially since America could not break the Saudi-Emirati alliance or stop the war from the Saudi side alone due to the damage to the Saudi leadership role in the Gulf. The situation remained at a standstill until the massive Saudi embarrassment following the brutal assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in early October 2018.
Third: With the assassination of the journalist Khashoggi in Istanbul, new circumstances emerged around Saudi Arabia that America could employ for its interests:
The Saudi security apparatuses committed a brutal act in their consulate, which sparked an international campaign demanding accountability for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Although Saudi Arabia and other criminal rulers in the region have committed acts against their citizens far worse than this assassination, this act possessed an emotional visibility that drove countries to condemn it severely. European countries wanted to use this to weaken America's agent, MBS, or remove him from power if possible. However, America rushed to provide international cover for MBS through President Trump's tweets expressing confidence in the Crown Prince's words, thereby distancing him from the accusation. Trump openly declared he would not abandon weapons contracts with Saudi Arabia, which increased pressure from Congress members who accused the Trump administration of selling "American values" for Saudi money. Consequently, the Senate issued a historic rebuke of Trump, voting to end military support for the war in Yemen and holding MBS responsible for the killing of Khashoggi (Reuters, 2018/12/14).
When statements from Congress members about the need to stop dealing with the "loyal American agent" MBS gained traction, the Trump administration scrambled to shift attention from the Khashoggi case to another issue that would show Saudi Arabia as being for human rights and peace. MBS was highlighted as cooperating in the Sweden talks. UN Secretary-General António Guterres focused on MBS's contribution, stating his role was "extremely important for the outcome of the consultations" (Sputnik Arabic, 2018/12/13). Even Griffiths was forced to praise this role. From all this, it becomes clear that America was interested in the agreement for three reasons:
- First: Improving Saudi Arabia's image.
- Second: Removing international embarrassment from Saudi Arabia and covering up the journalist's issue.
- Third: Financially extorting Saudi Arabia! This is the most important to Trump. America certainly does not improve images or remove embarrassment for the sake of its agents MBS and his father; rather, through this, America appears as their "rescuer" from a predicament and then exploits this to "drain" more Saudi oil money as the price. This fits Trump's "extortionist" business mentality based on the "pay up" policy.
What indicates this American interest in the agreement is the statements from US officials and the forcefulness of their phrasing, including:
- The US call for a ceasefire within 30 days and demanding the Saudi-led coalition stop bombing populated areas (Khalij Online, 2018/10/31).
- Sending UN Secretary-General Guterres to attend the final talks to ensure an agreement was reached, rather than leaving matters to the British envoy Griffiths.
- Saudi pressure on Yemeni President Hadi to accept the agreement. Sources told Al Jazeera that the government delegation recommended not signing because the text did not explicitly state the Houthi withdrawal from Hodeidah, but Hadi ordered them to sign after intense Saudi pressure (2018/12/13).
- The rapid appointment of a UN general to monitor the ceasefire.
- Public welcoming by Secretary of State Pompeo, considering that "peace has become possible in Yemen."
- The notable contact between the US Ambassador to Yemen, Matthew Tueller, and the Houthis in Stockholm, describing his meeting with them as "official and direct."
Fourth: Although the Sweden Agreement was achieved through American pressure, Britain also welcomed it because America had created a pressing public opinion regarding humanitarian motives. Britain had no choice but to welcome it while riding the wave to change its direction or at least slow its speed. At the same time, it submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council to discuss the agreement under the pretext of how to implement it.
Britain, by submitting this project, wants to make it an entry point for give-and-take regarding the agreement under the guise of monitoring, implementation, and withdrawal to prolong the process. The combatants on the ground do not care about the number of dead or the scale of destruction, but rather the realization of their interests. Accordingly, we can say:
America and its followers in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, are serious about ending the Yemen war now and moving toward negotiations that lead to a significant share of Yemen's rule for the Houthis—the followers of Iran, and consequently, the followers of America. The Sweden negotiations revealed this seriousness. However, this American direction does not mean America is capable of achieving it given the significant British influence in Yemen. Britain sent its Foreign Secretary to the negotiations to support its envoy Griffiths against Guterres. Thus, the agreement was limited to Hodeidah only, and other files like Sana'a airport were postponed. Furthermore, the government delegation's positions were skeptical of implementation, indicating they were made under pressure. All this opens a wide door for evading the agreement during implementation and stalling future rounds.
Therefore, it is likely that the implementation of the Hodeidah agreement will be difficult, as indicated by the clashes that occurred on the 14th, 15th, and 16th of December 2018 on the outskirts of Hodeidah shortly after the announcement.
Thus, the expected situation is a continuation of push and pull. On one hand, America wants to close the military theater, especially in Hodeidah, and move to political solutions while keeping the Houthi voice heard. On the other hand, Britain creates pretexts for continued fighting to achieve the greatest possible weakening of the Houthis so their voice is not heard in Hodeidah before heading to a political solution.
Fifth: Regarding the end of the question (is the Yemen crisis expected to end with this agreement?):
This agreement does not solve the crisis in Yemen due to the conflicting interests of America and Britain and their local tools. The most it can produce is a period of calm as a "warrior's rest," after which things will heat up again. It may involve a capitalist-style "middle solution" of shared rule according to the balance of power on both sides. Naturally, this does not end the crisis; events in Yemen will continue to fluctuate, calming at times and intensifying at others according to the political and military balance of power. As for what will end it, it is one of two things:
First: That America or Britain manages to settle matters in its favor, dominating influence in Yemen. This is far-fetched as explained.
Second: Which is the nearest, by Allah's permission, is that Allah honors this Ummah with the Khilafah (Caliphate). It will then trample the influence of the colonialist kuffar, uproot them from the land, and end their evils among the people. Then kufr and its people will be humiliated, and Islam and its people will be honored, and the believers will rejoice in the victory of Allah:
وَيَوْمَئِذٍ يَفْرَحُ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ بِنَصْرِ اللَّهِ يَنْصُرُ مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَهُوَ الْعَزِيزُ الرَّحِيمُ
"And on that day the believers will rejoice in the victory of Allah. He gives victory to whom He wills, and He is the Exalted in Might, the Merciful." (Surah Ar-Rum [30]: 4-5)
It is only right for the people of Yemen—the people of faith and wisdom—to establish this matter so they may succeed in both worlds. And Allah is the Protector of the righteous.
13th of Rabi’ al-Thani 1440 AH
2018/12/20 CE