Series of Answers by the Eminent Scholar Ata Bin Khalil Abu Al-Rashtah, Ameer of Hizb ut-Tahrir, to the Questions of the Visitors of his Facebook Page "Fiqhi"
Answer to Question To: Zahed Talib Na’im
Question:
Assalamu Alaikum Wa Rahmatullahi Wa Barakatuhu.
Subject: Dalalat al-Iqtida’ (Indication of Requirement).
Our eminent Sheikh, may Allah bless your efforts, guide your steps, and help you in what He loves and is pleased with.
It was stated in the book The Islamic Personality, Volume 3, under the topic "That without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is itself an obligation," page 44, what follows: "Whether the cause (sabab) is Shari’ah-based, such as the formula (sighah) in relation to the obligatory manumission (freeing a slave)." It seems to refer to the verse of the expiation for dhihar in the words of the Almighty:
وَالَّذِينَ يُظَاهِرُونَ مِن نِّسَائِهِمْ ثُمَّ يَعُودُونَ لِمَا قَالُوا فَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مِّن قَبْلِ أَن يَتَمَاسَّا ذَٰلِكُمْ تُوعَظُونَ بِهِ وَاللَّهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ خَبِيرٌ * فَمَن لَّمْ يَجِدْ فَصِيَامُ شَهْرَيْنِ مُتَتَابِعَيْنِ مِن قَبْلِ أَن يَتَمَاسَّا فَمَن لَّمْ يَسْتَطِعْ فَإِطْعَامُ سِتِّينَ مِسْكِينًا ذَٰلِكَ لِتُؤْمِنُوا بِاللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ
"And those who pronounce thihar from their wives and then [wish to] go back on what they said - then [there must be] the freeing of a slave before they touch one another. That is what you are admonished with; and Allah is Acquainted with what you do. And he who does not find [a slave] - then a fast for two months consecutively before they touch one another; and he who is unable - then the feeding of sixty poor persons. That is for you to believe in Allah and His Messenger." (QS Al-Mujadila [58]: 3-4)
Or the verse for the expiation of accidental killing in His saying:
وَمَا كَانَ لِمُؤْمِنٍ أَن يَقْتُلَ مُؤْمِنًا إِلَّا خَطَأً وَمَن قَتَلَ مُؤْمِنًا خَطَأً فَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مُّؤْمِنَةٍ وَدِيَةٌ مُّسَلَّمَةٌ إِلَىٰ أَهْلِهِ إِلَّا أَن يَصَّدَّقُوا فَإِن كَانَ مِن قَوْمٍ عَدُوٍّ لَّكُمْ وَهُوَ مُؤْمِنٌ فَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مُّؤْمِنَةٍ وَإِن كَانَ مِن قَوْمٍ بَيْنَكُمْ وَبَيْنَهُم مِّيثَاقٌ فَدِيَةٌ مُّسَلَّمَةٌ إِلَىٰ أَهْلِهِ وَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مُّؤْمِنَةٍ فَمَن لَّمْ يَجِدْ فَصِيَامُ شَهْرَيْنِ مُتَتَابِعَيْنِ تَوْبَةً مِّنَ اللَّهِ وَكَانَ اللَّهُ عَلِيمًا حَكِيمًا
"And never is it for a believer to kill a believer except by mistake. And whoever kills a believer by mistake - then the freeing of a believing slave and a compensation payment presented to his family [is required] unless they give [it as] charity. But if the deceased was from a people at war with you and he was a believer - then [only] the freeing of a believing slave. And if he was from a people with whom you have a treaty - then a compensation payment presented to his family and the freeing of a believing slave. And whoever does not find [one or cannot afford to buy one] - then [instead], a fast for two months consecutively, [seeking] acceptance of repentance from Allah. And Allah is ever Knowing and Wise." (QS An-Nisa [4]: 92)
It also stated in the same book, page 182, what follows: "Dalalat al-Iqtida’ is that in which the necessity (lazim) is derived from the meanings of the words, in that it is a condition for the meaning indicated by correspondence (mutabaqah)."
Two issues have become confusing to me:
First: Why was the "condition" (sharṭ) mentioned without the "cause" (sabab), even though the formula (sighah) is a cause in relation to the obligatory manumission? It appears to me that the formula is obligatory by way of Dalalat al-Iqtida’?
Second: Why was "correspondence" (mutabaqah) mentioned without "inclusion" (tadamun)?
I hope I have not burdened you with these questions, and may Allah bless you.
Answer:
Wa Alaikum Assalam Wa Rahmatullahi Wa Barakatuhu,
First Question: You are asking why the "condition" was mentioned in the definition of Dalalat al-Iqtida’ and not the "cause." It seems you understood from The Islamic Personality in the example ("Free your slave on my behalf") that it requires the condition of ownership, and thus the definition relied on the "condition"... and you understood from "That without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled" in the example ("such as the formula in obligatory manumission") where it stated that the formula is a cause, and you saw that this is by Dalalat al-Iqtida’ and is a cause; so you wondered why the cause was not mentioned in the definition of Dalalat al-Iqtida’ as the condition was?
The answer is that the matter is different, and this becomes clear from the reality of Dalalat al-Iqtida’ and "that without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled"... these realities are different. Dalalat al-Iqtida’ is among the linguistic researches related to the explicit (mantooq) and implicit (mafhum) meanings, etc. As for the rule "That without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is itself an obligation," it is a Shari’ah principle, i.e., a general rule (hukm kulli). These should not be mixed because Dalalat al-Iqtida’ is understood according to linguistic standards, while the rule is understood according to the Shari’ah evidences from which the rule was derived... meaning that each of the two matters has principles upon which it is built, as shown by the definition of each:
*First: Dalalat al-Iqtida’:* The scholars of Usul have defined Dalalat al-Iqtida’ with three important definitions:
- First: One where the condition or cause is not mentioned... rather, it mentions the indication of necessity (dalalat al-iltizam) required by the explicit meaning for the truthfulness of the speaker or the correctness of the utterance. Among these definitions:
- It stated in Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam by Abu al-Hassan Sayf al-Din al-Amidi (d. 631 AH): "[The first type is Dalalat al-Iqtida’: it is that whose indication is not by its explicit formula or placement, and that is either the intended meaning of the speaker or unintended. If it is intended, then it either depends on the truthfulness of the speaker or the correctness of the utterance, or it does not. If it depends on it, then the indication of the word upon it is called Dalalat al-Iqtida’...]"... and similar to this was mentioned in my book Taysir al-Wusul ila al-Usul.
- Second: It maintained the same definition but detailed it more, touching upon the declaratory law (al-hukm al-wad’i) (the condition) alone, because it saw that the condition is the first thing that comes to mind in the indication of necessity for the explicit meaning, and others follow it by evidence. Therefore, when they gave the example of manumission, they touched upon the condition of manumission, which is ownership, and did not touch upon the cause of ownership, which is the formula (sighah), because this is not reached via Dalalat al-Iqtida’ but via evidences. The example they gave, "Free your slave on my behalf," is understood by iqtida’ to require the realization of ownership first for the manumission to be valid. As for the cause of the ownership contract through a specific formula, this is understood from Shari’ah evidences... Among these definitions:
- It stated in Al-Mustasfa fi ‘Ilm al-Usul by Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Ghazali al-Tusi (d. 505 AH): "(The second art: regarding what is gleaned from words, not from the aspect of their formula but from the aspect of their implication and indication, and they are five types. The first type: what is called requirement (iqtida’), which is that which the word does not indicate directly and is not spoken, but is from the necessity of the word, either from the aspect that the speaker cannot be truthful except with it, or from the aspect that the existence of the utterance is prohibited by Shari’ah except with it, or from the aspect that its establishment is intellectually impossible except with it... As for the example of what is established by requirement for the Shari’ah conceptualization of the utterance, it is the saying of the speaker: 'Free your slave on my behalf,' for it includes ownership and requires it, though he did not speak it; however, the spoken manumission, the condition for its Shari’ah execution is the precedence of ownership, so that was the requirement of the word...)" Similar to this was mentioned in Al-Bahr al-Muhit fi Usul al-Fiqh by al-Zarkashi (d. 794 AH).
- Third: It maintained the two previous definitions but detailed the condition further, saying that the condition of the indicated meaning is by correspondence (mutabaqah) and not by inclusion (tadamun)... Among these definitions:
- It stated in Al-Mahsul fi ‘Ilm al-Usul by Muhammad bin Umar bin al-Hussein al-Razi (d. 606 AH): "As for the division of the indication of necessity (dalalat al-iltizam), we say the meaning derived from the indication of necessity is either derived from the meanings of individual words or from the state of their composition. The first has two divisions because the meaning indicated by necessity is either a condition for the meaning indicated by correspondence (mutabaqah) or an adjunct to it. If it is the first, it is called Dalalat al-Iqtida’. Then that conditionality may be intellectual, such as his (saw) saying: 'Mistake and forgetfulness have been lifted from my Ummah,' for the intellect indicates that this meaning is not correct unless we assume within it the Shari’ah ruling. Or it may be Shari’ah-based, such as one's saying: 'By Allah, I will free this slave,' for it necessitates the acquisition of ownership because he cannot fulfill his word legally except after that...)"
As we said, the three definitions do not differ in general terms but rather in terms of detail regarding the condition...
In The Islamic Personality, Vol. 3, we saw that the definition according to linguistic research is the one that addresses the condition and correspondence, so we said:
"Dalalat al-Iqtida’ is that in which the necessity (lazim) is derived from the meanings of the words, in that it is a condition for the meaning indicated by correspondence (mutabaqah). The necessity might be required by the intellect, or it might be required by the Shari’ah, either for the necessity of the speaker’s truthfulness or for the correctness of the utterance. An example of that is the saying of the Almighty:
قَاتِلُوا الَّذِينَ يَلُونَكُم
'Fight those who are adjacent to you' (QS At-Tawba [9]: 123)
For His saying: 'Fight' necessitates the command to obtain the tools of fighting such as weapons, equipment, training... etc. This is what the intellect requires, and it is a condition for the correctness of the occurrence of the utterance, which is: 'Fight'. And like your saying to another: 'Free your slave on my behalf for a thousand Dirhams'; the understood necessity from the meaning of 'free the slave' is through sale or gift, and that understanding is what the realization of this meaning depends upon in Shari’ah, as there is no manumission in what the son of Adam does not own. It is as if it was said: 'Sell or gift this slave to me, then be my agent in the manumission.' This is what the Shari’ah requires, and it is a condition for the correctness of the occurrence of the utterance, which is 'Free'. And like the saying of the Prophet (saw):
إِنَّ اللَّهَ وَضَعَ عَنْ أُمَّتِي الْخَطَأَ، وَالنِّسْيَانَ، وَمَا اسْتُكْرِهُوا عَلَيْهِ
'Allah has pardoned for my Ummah mistake, forgetfulness, and what they are coerced into.' (Reported by Ibn Majah)
Meaning: He lifted the ruling of the mistake, forgetfulness, and what they were coerced into. Since it is not true that He lifted these actual things themselves as they certainly occur, this is what the Shari’ah requires for the necessity of the speaker’s truthfulness."
As you can see, it is a complete definition of Dalalat al-Iqtida’ from all its aspects, and Allah is the Helper.
Second: As for the general rule (ma la yatimmu al-wajib illa bihi), its definition does not stop at linguistic research but extends to Shari’ah evidences... so they researched the thing without which the obligation is not complete, whether it was a part of it or external to it like the cause (sabab), the condition (sharṭ), and the preventive (mani’). They did not restrict themselves to Dalalat al-Iqtida’ alone, but focused on the evidences. For example, when they gave an example for the "cause" in the chapter of "that without which the obligation is not complete," they said: "Whether the cause is Shari’ah-based like the obligatory manumission," which refers to the case when the slave belongs to you and you want to free him; the condition of ownership is fulfilled and you want to know the formula, so this is not understood from iqtida’ but rather the evidence is relied upon... and the difference is clear between this example of him being owned by you and the previous example in your saying: "Free your slave on my behalf," for this is understood by iqtida’, meaning you must own him first, otherwise how can you free him when he is owned by someone else?! Ownership is a condition for the realization of the explicit meaning.
Because the evidences are the reference here, ijtihad occurred regarding them... therefore they differed about the thing without which the obligation is not complete. It was said this thing is obligatory if it is a cause or a condition... and it was said if it is a cause and not a condition... and it was said if it is a condition and not a cause... and it was said neither this nor that, but suspension (tawaqquf)... The detail of this was mentioned in Al-Bahr al-Muhit (1/254) by al-Zarkashi (d. 794 AH), as well as in Sharh al-Kawkab al-Munir (1/182) by its author Taqi al-Din Abu al-Baqa Muhammad al-Futuhi, known as Ibn al-Najjar (d. 972 AH), and it can be referred to for whoever wants more.
As for what we have outweighed and mentioned in The Islamic Personality, Vol. 3, based on the evidences from which that rule was derived, it is that everything without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is itself an obligation, whatever that thing may be, whether a cause or a condition, and whatever its type... Therefore, after we said in the definition: "That without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is of two types: one where its obligation is conditioned upon that thing, and the second where its obligation is not conditioned by it, i.e., by that thing. As for that whose obligation is conditioned by it, there is no disagreement that obtaining the condition is not obligatory; rather, what is obligatory is what the evidence brought as an obligation, such as the obligation of a specific prayer, for it is conditioned on the existence of purity (taharah). So purity is not obligatory from the aspect of the address for prayer, but it is a condition for performing the obligation. The obligation in the address for prayer is only the prayer if the condition is found..." and after we explained the reality of the condition... we concluded the research by saying:
"In summary, the thing without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is obligatory, either by the address of the obligation itself or by another address, whether this thing is a cause (sabab)—which is that whose presence necessitates the presence [of the effect] and whose absence necessitates the absence—or a condition (sharṭ)—which is that whose absence necessitates the absence but whose presence does not necessitate presence or absence. And whether the cause is Shari’ah-based like the formula (sighah) in relation to the obligatory manumission, or intellectual like the reflection that produces obligatory knowledge, or habitual like slitting the throat in relation to obligatory killing. And whether the condition is also Shari’ah-based like wudu for example, or intellectual—which is that which is necessary for the commanded act intellectually, like leaving the opposites of the commanded act—or habitual—which is usually inseparable from it like washing a part of the head in wudu. So the obligation of a thing necessitates the obligation of that without which it is not complete, i.e., the obligation for a thing requires the obligation for that without which it is not complete. From here came the rule: 'That without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is itself an obligation.'" End.
Thus, the answer to the first question—why the condition was mentioned in the definition of Dalalat al-Iqtida’ and the cause was not—has become clear as we explained above and I repeat it here:
"Because the condition is the first thing that comes to mind in the indication of necessity for the explicit meaning, and others follow it by evidence. Therefore, when they gave the example of manumission, they touched upon the condition of manumission, which is ownership, and did not touch upon the cause of ownership, which is the formula, because this is not reached via Dalalat al-Iqtida’ but via evidences. The example they gave 'Free your slave on my behalf' is understood by iqtida’ to require the realization of ownership first for the manumission to be valid, whereas the cause of the ownership contract by a specific formula is understood from the evidences..."
And as far as I know, the scholars of Usul did not include "cause" in the definition of Dalalat al-Iqtida’... this is the answer to the first question as far as I know, and Allah is Most Knowing and Most Wise.
Second Question: As for why it was stated in the definition: "Dalalat al-Iqtida’ is that in which the necessity (lazim) is derived from the meanings of the words, in that it is a condition for the meaning indicated by correspondence (mutabaqah)," by mentioning "correspondence" and not "inclusion" (tadamun), that is because the indication of inclusion (dalalat al-tadamun) and the indication of necessity (dalalat al-iltizam) are adjuncts to the indication of correspondence (dalalat al-mutabaqah), i.e., they are not the origin... and the explanation for that is:
The origin in indication is correspondence (mutabaqah), i.e., the indication of the word on the whole of its meaning. The word is not diverted to a part of its meaning (i.e., to inclusion) except by specification (takhsis) or restriction (taqyid)... in other words, except for an necessitating reason according to the linguistic research in this chapter.
The indication of necessity (dalalat al-iltizam) is the mental necessity of the indication of the spoken word, i.e., it follows it. Since the origin in the word’s indication is correspondence, i.e., the whole meaning, so its necessity must also be based on the whole meaning ("correspondence")... and because this necessity, as we explained in the answer to the first question, is a condition for executing the meaning of the spoken word, therefore the definition of Dalalat al-Iqtida’ was as it appeared in The Islamic Personality, Vol. 3: "Dalalat al-Iqtida’ is that in which the necessity (lazim) is derived from the meanings of the words, in that it is a condition for the meaning indicated by correspondence (mutabaqah)."
This is completely clear in Dalalat al-Iqtida’. It is not possible for the thing required by the text—i.e., the mental necessity of the text—to be anything other than correspondence ("the whole meaning"), and nothing is excluded from it except by a text. For example:
"And fight..." the mental necessity, i.e., Dalalat al-Iqtida’, is the tools of fighting in war generally with all possible weapons. It is not said "only with the sword," and others do not enter into the indication of necessity, or "with the cannon" and others do not enter into the necessity, and so on... rather, it is with the whole meaning ("correspondence"), so every possible type of weapon that can be used in war enters into the necessity...
"And ask the village..." the mental necessity, i.e., Dalalat al-Iqtida’, is the people (ahl), i.e., the people of the village. The brothers of Yusuf (as) said to their father to prove the truthfulness of their word that he should ask the people of the village, and it is with the whole meaning, i.e., ask whomever you wish of the people of the village and you will see the truth of our word... it is not possible here that the brothers of Yusuf intended for their father to ask a part of the people of the village and that he is forbidden from asking the other part, because then it would be an evidence against them and not for them, as they would have intended for their father to ask specific people who agree with them!
Therefore, the meaning changes... and thus Dalalat al-Iqtida’ ("the people") is by the whole meaning ("correspondence").
- "Free your slave on my behalf..." the mental necessity is that you possess him then free him. Ownership here is that you possess him entirely so that it is permissible for you to free him, i.e., correspondence ("the whole meaning"), and so on.
Thus, the meaning of "the mental necessity of the spoken word" must be by correspondence (mutabaqah), i.e., by the whole meaning, and nothing is excluded from it except by a text... and not by a part of the meaning (tadamun)...
I hope this answer is sufficient, and Allah is Most Knowing and Most Wise.
Your brother, Ata Bin Khalil Abu Al-Rashtah
03 Safar 1441 AH Corresponding to 02/10/2019 CE
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