Series of answers by the eminent scholar Ata Bin Khalil Abu Al-Rashtah, Ameer of Hizb ut-Tahrir, to the questions of the visitors to his Facebook page "Fiqhi"
Answer to a Question
To: Zahid Talib Na'im
The Question:
Assalamu Alaikum Wa Rahmatullahi Wa Barakatuh,
Our eminent Sheikh, may Allah bless your efforts, guide your steps, grant you a great reward, ease the difficulties for you, and honor us with the victory of His Deen. Indeed, He is the All-Hearing, the Responder to supplications.
Subject: Queries regarding Qiyas
First, please excuse me for the lengthiness; may Allah aid you in His obedience and place your patience in the balance of your good deeds.
First: It was stated in the answer to a question dated 07/02/2014 CE:
"(As for your observation regarding what was mentioned in the book: 'The fact that Qiyas is a Shari'ah evidence has been established by definitive proof (Dali Qat'i) and speculative proofs (Adillah Zhanni).' Your statement has a correct aspect. Although the term 'evidence' (Dali) is used in both Usul and Fiqh, its meaning differs in terms of being definitive or speculative. Since the subject here is about the Usul (foundational) evidences, it is better to restrict it to definitive evidence without the speculative. Therefore, it is better to correct it, and we will correct it, Allah willing.)" End quote.
The correction appeared in the updated version dated 16/07/2019, p. 322, in two places.
However, when I completed the topic, I encountered some sentences that confused my understanding, and I could not reconcile them with the new correction. They are as follows:
P. 323: ("All these Hadiths are evidence that Qiyas is a Hujjah (legal authority). The aspect of using them as proof is that the Messenger linked the debt of Allah to the debt of a human being in the obligation of repayment and its benefit, which is the essence of Qiyas.")
P. 325: ("It is not known that there was any denouncer of these incidents, and they were famous among the Companions despite being matters that would usually be denounced. Their silence regarding them, while they were not ones to remain silent, was an Ijmā' (consensus) from them that Qiyas is a Shari'ah Hujjah.")
P. 326: ("From this, it becomes clear that the Hadith, the Ijmā' of the Companions, and the Messenger's justification for many rulings are evidence that Qiyas is a Shari'ah evidence from among the evidences that serve as a Hujjah that the ruling deduced by it is a Shari'ah ruling... Therefore, these evidences are not a Hujjah for Qiyas in absolute terms; rather, they are a Hujjah for the Qiyas whose Illah (effective cause) has been indicated by a Shari'ah evidence, and this is the Qiyas considered by Shari'ah.")
It appeared to me as if these three instances contradict what was mentioned in the two places referred to above. I hope you would kindly clarify what is confusing me.
Second: It was mentioned in the book Al-Bahr al-Muhit by Al-Zarkashi—Book of Qiyas—Chapter Three on the Obligation of Acting upon Qiyas: ("Second: Is the auditory/transmitted (Sam'i) evidence for it definitive (Qat'i) or speculative (Zhanni)? The majority said the former, while Abu al-Husayn and al-Amidi said the latter.") End quote. He also said in another place: ("Third: Ijmā' of the Companions: They agreed on acting upon Qiyas, and that was narrated from them in word and deed. Ibn Aqil al-Hanbali said: The mass-transmission in meaning (Tawatur Ma'nawi) from the Companions regarding its use has reached us, and it is definitive.") End quote.
Is it possible that speculative auditory evidences have reached the level of Tawatur Ma'nawi and thus become definitive evidence for the authority of Qiyas?
Third: It was mentioned in the book The Islamic Personality (Al-Shakhsiyya), Volume 3, p. 323: ("All these Hadiths are evidence that Qiyas is a Hujjah. The aspect of using them as proof is that the Messenger linked the debt of Allah to the debt of a human being in the obligation of repayment and its benefit, which is the essence of Qiyas.")
1- Did the Qiyas performed by the Messenger (saw) mentioned in the paragraph follow the linguistic meaning to bring the image closer and facilitate understanding for the listener, or did he use it in the technical sense, applying the definition mentioned in The Islamic Personality, Volume 3, p. 321: ("Qiyas is defined as establishing the likeness of a known ruling for another known matter due to their sharing the same Illah of the ruling according to the one establishing it")?
2- Is the Illah of repayment—being a 'debt'—derived from the texts subject to analogy? For example, can a man pray all the obligatory prayers his deceased father neglected during his lifetime, by analogy to performing Hajj on his behalf, as they both share the Illah of "being a debt," keeping in mind that acts of worship (Ibadat) are not reasoned (la tu'allal)?
3- Why is the Hajj of a child on behalf of an incapable parent called "repayment" (Qada) and the Hajj considered a debt to Allah, when it is known that the obligation of Hajj is contingent upon capability?
Fourth: It was mentioned in The Islamic Personality, Volume 3, p. 336, regarding the conditions of the branch (Far'): ("Fourth: That the ruling of the branch is not explicitly mentioned in a text (Nass), otherwise it would be a Qiyas of what is already explicitly stated. Neither of them would be more deserving of being an analogy for the other than vice versa. It is not said that the synonymy of evidences for a single meaning is permissible, because this is only in matters other than Qiyas, such as a ruling being established by the Book, the Sunnah, and the Ijmā' of the Companions. As for Qiyas, what is established is the Illah, and its extension to the ruling of the branch is what brings the Qiyas into existence. If there is a text for a ruling in the branch, then the ruling is established by the text, not by the Illah, so there is no place for Qiyas.") End quote. How then can Qiyas proceed from the Messenger (saw), when everything issued by him is considered a Shari'ah Nass that negates Qiyas? Imam Al-Shawkani pointed to this meaning in his book Irshad al-Fuhul, answering those who consider the Hadiths as evidence for the authority of Qiyas: ("The response to that is: these analogies were issued by the Infallible Legislator, about whom Allah says regarding what he brought us from Him:
إِنْ هُوَ إِلَّا وَحْيٌ يُوحَى
'It is not but a revelation revealed.' (QS. An-Najm [53]: 4)
And He says regarding the obligation of following him:
وَمَا آتَاكُمُ الرَّسُولُ فَخُذُوهُ وَمَا نَهَاكُمْ عَنْهُ فَانْتَهُوا
'And whatever the Messenger has given you - take; and what he has forbidden you - refrain from.' (QS. Al-Hashr [59]: 7)
And that is outside the point of contention. The Qiyas we are discussing is the Qiyas of one whose infallibility is not established, nor is following him mandatory (in his personal views), nor was his speech revelation (Wahi); rather, it is from his own commanding soul and by his intellect which can be overcome by error. We have previously stated that consensus has occurred on the establishment of proof by the analogies issued by him (saw).") End quote.
Fifth: It was mentioned in The Islamic Personality, Volume 3, p. 335: ("The use of Qiyas needs a precise understanding. It is not permissible to use Qiyas to deduce a ruling except for a Mujtahid, even if he is a Mujtahid in a single issue.") How then can we attribute Qiyas to the Messenger (saw) when it is not permissible for him (saw) to be a Mujtahid?
May Allah teach us what benefits us and benefit us with what He taught us, for indeed He is the All-Knowing, the All-Wise. Our final prayer is that all praise belongs to Allah, Lord of the Worlds.
The Answer:
Wa Alaikum Assalam Wa Rahmatullahi Wa Barakatuh,
Firstly, may Allah bless you for your kind prayer for us, and we likewise pray for your goodness...
My brother, you have asked many questions on a single topic. It would have been better to suffice with one question, and once we answered it, you could follow it with another, rather than sending seven questions together... Nevertheless, we saw fit to answer them because they are related to our books and culture (Tsaqafah)... But in the future, do not send several questions at once; ease our burden, may Allah have mercy on you.
1- Regarding your first question about those three places in the book The Islamic Personality, Volume 3:
It is true that we made an amendment to the book The Islamic Personality, Volume 3, in the chapter on Qiyas, based on what was mentioned in our answer dated 7 Rabi' al-Akhir 1435 AH / 07/02/2014 CE. However, in the amendment, we ensured that the research was divided into two parts:
A first part related to the evidences for establishing Qiyas: We restricted the matter to the definitive evidence (Dali Qat'i) and did not include speculative evidences.
*A second part related to the guidance toward Qiyas and explaining its reality: In this part, we cited evidences from the Sunnah and Ijmā'. We did not restrict it to definitive evidences because this is not the context of proving Qiyas as a Shari'ah evidence, as we already proved that in the first part of the research.*
There is no doubt that the evidences we cited in the second part of the research from the Sunnah and Ijmā' are speculative evidences that explain the reality of Qiyas, but they are not definitive evidences for the authority of Qiyas. This does not harm the argument because we did not use them in the context of proving the authority of Qiyas, as I mentioned earlier, but in another context, which is guiding toward Qiyas and explaining its reality. To clarify further, I will quote the relevant part of the previous text from The Islamic Personality, Volume 3, before the amendment, and then the corresponding part from the new text after the amendment:
A- The text before the amendment:
("And Qiyas is a Shari'ah evidence for Shari'ah rulings; it is a Hujjah to prove that a ruling is a Shari'ah ruling. The fact that Qiyas is a Shari'ah evidence has been established by definitive proof and speculative proofs. As for the definitive proof, it is that the place of considering Qiyas as a Shari'ah evidence is only in the case where Qiyas refers back to the text itself...
As for the speculative evidences, they are evidences for Qiyas and also evidences for the type of Qiyas that is considered a Shari'ah evidence. The fact that Qiyas is a Hujjah has been established by the Sunnah and the Ijmā' of the Companions; it has been established that the Messenger (saw) guided toward Qiyas and approved Qiyas. On the authority of Ibn Abbas...") End quote.
B- The text after the amendment:
("And Qiyas is a Shari'ah evidence for Shari'ah rulings; it is a Hujjah to prove that a ruling is a Shari'ah ruling. The fact that Qiyas is a Shari'ah evidence has been established by definitive proof, which is that the place of considering Qiyas as a Shari'ah evidence is only in the case where Qiyas refers back to the text itself;...
And the Messenger of Allah (saw) guided toward Qiyas and approved Qiyas. On the authority of Ibn Abbas...") End quote.
As is clear from the amendment, in the first paragraph, when establishing Qiyas as an Usuli Hujjah, we restricted it to the definitive proof and did not touch upon the speculative evidences. As for the beginning of the second paragraph, which before the amendment served as a continuation of the evidences for establishing Qiyas, we made the amendment in a way that makes it a different subject rather than proving that Qiyas is one of the Usul. Instead, we made it about the guidance toward Qiyas and explaining its reality. For this, the speculative evidences we cited from the Sunnah and Ijmā' are sufficient. Therefore, there is no need to amend those three places you pointed out because they are not in the context of proving Qiyas as one of the Usul, but in another context, as we explained (guidance toward Qiyas and explaining its reality).
Perhaps you were confused by the Hadiths we mentioned afterward which contain an indication of Qiyas, where we said: ("All these Hadiths are evidence that Qiyas is a Hujjah. The aspect of using them as proof is that the Messenger linked the debt of Allah to the debt of a human being in the obligation of repayment and its benefit, which is the essence of Qiyas.") There is nothing wrong with this. As long as we have provided the definitive proof for Qiyas, there is nothing to prevent the mention of other speculative evidences that contain arguments for Qiyas. When we introduced that amendment, it was for the sake of focusing first on the definitive nature of the evidence for Qiyas, not a denial of the existence of speculative evidences.
2- Regarding the second question about auditory evidences being mass-transmitted in meaning (Tawatur Ma'nawi):
It is not far-fetched that the evidences for Qiyas from the Sunnah and from the Ijmā' of the Companions, due to their abundance and diversity, have reached the level of Tawatur Ma'nawi, as Imam Al-Zarkashi noted in Al-Bahr al-Muhit according to your quote from him. However, we did not resort to this deduction in proving the authority of Qiyas because the matter might be disputed by an opponent, and because the definitive proof we provided to establish Qiyas is a crushing definitive proof that is sufficient on its own to prove the authority of Qiyas and is difficult for an opponent to dispute.
3- Regarding your third, sixth, and seventh questions, which are all from the same category:
The Messenger (saw) guided toward Qiyas and did not perform Qiyas, because the Prophet (saw) knows the Shari'ah ruling from revelation and not by his own Ijtihad. It is not correct for the Prophet (saw) to be a Mujtahid, as is explained in its proper places. The examples we cited from the Sunnah all involve guidance from the Prophet (saw) toward Qiyas and how to use it, which is by way of teaching the Muslims. But it does not mean that the Prophet (saw) performed Qiyas, because the fruit of Qiyas is reaching a Shari'ah ruling that the Mujtahid does not know, while the Messenger (saw) knows the Shari'ah ruling from revelation and thus does not need Qiyas or Ijtihad to know the Shari'ah ruling. I have clarified this matter completely in my book Taysir al-Wusul ila al-Usul when discussing the authority of Qiyas as follows:
["The Messenger (saw) guided toward the use of Qiyas. When he (saw) was asked about performing Hajj for someone else and about the kiss of a fasting person, he did not give the ruling to the questioner directly. Instead, he answered after mentioning the shared Illah in the repayment of a human debt and in rinsing the mouth (madmadah), guiding the Muslims toward the use of Qiyas."]
(It was narrated from him (saw) that a man from Khath'am asked him, saying: "My father has reached the time of Islam while he is an old man who cannot sit firmly on a mount, and Hajj has been prescribed for him. Shall I perform Hajj on his behalf?" He (saw) said: "Are you his eldest son?" He said: "Yes." He (saw) said: "Do you see that if your father had a debt and you paid it off for him, would that suffice for him?" He said: "Yes." He (saw) said: "Then perform Hajj for him.")
(On the authority of Umar, who said: "I felt cheerful one day and I kissed (my wife) while I was fasting. I came to the Prophet (saw) and said: 'I have done a grave matter today! I kissed while I was fasting.' The Messenger of Allah (saw) said: 'Do you see if you were to rinse your mouth with water while fasting?' I said: 'There is no harm in it.' He (saw) said: 'Then for what (do you worry)?'")
However, this ruling does not mean that the Messenger made an analogy; rather, he (saw) gave the ruling as revelation from Allah to him, in a form that guides toward the use of Qiyas, because everything narrated from the Messenger (saw) of speech, action, or silent approval is revelation from Allah, as we explained in the previous research on the Sunnah.] End quote from the book Al-Taysir.
4- Regarding your fourth question about the analogy of prayer to debt:
The Qiyas toward which the Hadiths guided on the subject of Hajj contains two matters:
a- Comparing the debt of Allah (swt) to the debt of a human being in the obligation of repayment and its benefit. That is, the act of worship that a person did not perform is a debt on his conscience that must be repaid, and its repayment removes the debt from his conscience just as a human debt must be paid and its payment removes that debt.
b- That a person's repayment of the debt he owes to Allah removes this debt from him. Likewise, the repayment by another (the child) of the debt owed to Allah by a person removes the debt from that person even though he is not the one who repaid it, by analogy to a human debt which is removed from a person by another's repayment on his behalf.
By applying this to the subject of prayer, the following becomes clear:
The prayer that is on a person's conscience which he did not perform without a Shari'ah excuse must be repaid. If the person repays it himself, it is removed from him by this repayment, by analogy to a human debt which must be repaid and which is removed from him if he pays it. This analogy is correct because it is free from any contradicting evidence. Naturally, the removal of the debt to Allah by repaying the prayer does not mean the removal of the sin from the person for delaying the prayer and not performing it in its time; rather, it only means the removal of the debt from his conscience, meaning he is no longer demanded to perform that prayer because he repaid it. The subject of the sin due to delaying the prayer from its time is a different matter.
As for comparing the debt of Allah to a human debt regarding the removal of the debt by another's (the child's) repayment—specifically the child praying on behalf of his father—this analogy does not stand as it is not free from a contradiction. This is because one of the conditions of the branch being compared is "that it be free from a predominant contradiction that necessitates the opposite of what the Illah of Qiyas necessitated, for the Qiyas to be useful." The branch here is prayer, and evidences have been provided for the obligation that a person must perform it for himself and that it is not removed from him by another's performance, nor does it accept proxy or delegation, like all other individual obligations (Wajibat Ainiyyah). Allah (swt) said:
وَأَنْ لَيْسَ لِلْإِنْسَانِ إِلَّا مَا سَعَى
"And that there is not for man except that [good] for which he strives." (QS. An-Najm [53]: 39)
The Shari'ah has obligated the Muslim to pray sitting if he cannot stand, and by gesturing if he cannot do otherwise, and did not allow anyone else to stand in his place for it. The understanding of performance from him in these severe medical cases means that it is not permissible for someone else to do it for him. Therefore, the analogy of prayer to a human debt in terms of it being removed from the person by another's repayment is incorrect and does not stand due to the presence of contradicting evidences that restrict the performance of this duty to the person himself. Thus, those predominant contradicting evidences are acted upon and the implication of the Qiyas is abandoned, as is established in the science of Usul.
It should not be said that the debt of Allah (swt) was removed in Hajj, fasting, and Zakat, etc., by another's repayment by analogy to a human debt, so it should also be removed by the repayment of prayer by another by analogy to a human debt. This is not said because the removal of Hajj, fasting, and Zakat... etc., by another's repayment was not established by Qiyas, but was established by the text (Nass) in the noble Prophetic Hadiths that guided toward Qiyas. Thus, one must restrict himself to what the texts brought. Repayment on behalf of another in prayer was not mentioned in any Sunnah from the Messenger of Allah (saw). Therefore, it remains on its original rule of the obligation of its performance and repayment by the person himself and the impermissibility of delegation or proxy in it. The texts mentioned regarding the repayment of prayer are related to the one who missed the prayer and not anyone else, including:
- Muslim narrated in his Sahih on the authority of Abu Hurairah that the Messenger of Allah (saw) said:
مَنْ نَسِيَ الصَّلَاةَ فَلْيُصَلِّهَا إِذَا ذَكَرَهَا فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ قَالَ: أَقِمْ الصَّلَاةَ لِذِكْرِي
"Whoever forgets a prayer, let him pray it when he remembers it, for indeed Allah said: 'Establish prayer for My remembrance.'" (QS. Taha [20]: 14)
- Ibn Abi Shaybah narrated in his Musannaf on the authority of Anas, who said: The Prophet (saw) said:
مَنْ نَسِيَ صَلَاةً أَوْ نَامَ عَنْهَا فَكَفَّارَتُهُ أَنْ يُصَلِّيَهَا إذَا ذَكَرَهَا
"Whoever forgets a prayer or sleeps through it, his expiation is to pray it when he remembers it."
- Al-Daraqutni narrated in his Sunan on the authority of Bilal, who said: We were with the Prophet (saw) on a journey,
فَنَامَ حَتَّى طَلَعَتِ الشَّمْسُ فَأَمَرَ بِلاَلاً فَأَذَّنَ ثُمَّ تَوَضَّأَ فَصَلَّى رَكْعَتَيْنِ ثُمَّ صَلَّوُا الْغَدَاةَ
"And he slept until the sun rose. He then ordered Bilal to call the Adhan, then he performed Wudu, prayed two Rak'ahs, and then they prayed the morning prayer."
It is clear from the texts that they relate to the one who missed the prayer, and no text was mentioned stating that it is permissible for someone else to repay it for him, such as a child for his father. Therefore, the repayment remains linked to the one who missed the prayer from its time.
5- Regarding your question: ("Why is the Hajj of a child on behalf of an incapable parent called 'repayment' (Qada) and the Hajj considered a debt to Allah, when it is known that the obligation of Hajj is contingent upon capability?")
The answer to that is that we clarified in The Islamic Personality, Volume 3, in the chapter "The Generality of the Expression in the Specificity of the Cause" (Umum al-Lafzh fi Khusus al-Sabab), that generality is in the subject of the incident and the question and not a generality in everything. We said: ("The generality of the discourse in the incident and the answer to the question is only in the subject of the question and is not general to everything, i.e., it is general for that subject in that incident and others... Accordingly, the generality is only in the subject, the subject of the incident and the question, so it is specific to it and does not include others. Thus, the subject does not enter into the rule of 'consideration is given to the generality of the expression and not the specificity of the cause' because it is other than the cause, i.e., other than the incident and the question, and because the speech is directed toward it and not others, so it is specific to it; because the expression of the Messenger is linked to the subject of the question and the subject of the incident, so the ruling is linked to that subject. The text said in a specific incident, and the text that is an answer to a question, must be specified to the subject of the question or the incident, and it is not correct for it to be general in everything; because the question is repeated in the answer, and because the speech is on a specific subject, so the ruling must be restricted to that subject... So, the generality of the expression in the specificity of the cause is not a generality in everything, but a generality in the subject about which the talk took place, or about which the question was asked.")
Here, the subject asked about in the Hadith is "the Hajj of a capable child on behalf of his incapable father" and nothing else. Thus, the generality remains in the Hajj of a child for his father if the child is capable and the father is incapable; the child performs Hajj for his father, even if Hajj was not obligatory on the incapable father. Any issue other than this requires another evidence.
We have previously answered a similar question on 04 Rajab 1434 AH / 14 May 2013 CE, and it stated:
(... Regarding the Hadith you mentioned: On the authority of Yusuf bin al-Zubayr, from Abdullah bin al-Zubayr, who said: A man from Khath'am came to the Messenger of Allah (saw) and said: "My father is an old man who cannot ride, and Allah's obligation of Hajj has reached him. Does it suffice that I perform Hajj on his behalf?" He (saw) said: "Are you his eldest son?" He said: "Yes." He (saw) said: "Do you see that if he had a debt, would you pay it off?" He said: "Yes." He (saw) said: "Then perform Hajj for him."
Narrated by Al-Nasa'i. Yusuf bin al-Zubayr was alone in mentioning the phrase "Are you his eldest son," and therefore some researchers spoke about it for this reason. As for the rest of the Hadith, it is authentic according to the majority of researchers, and there are those who authenticated it even with the wording "his eldest son." Nevertheless, the Hadith was narrated without the mention of "his eldest son" on the authority of Ibn Abbas:
Ibn Hibban narrated in his Sahih on the authority of Sulayman bin Yasar, who said: Abdullah bin Abbas narrated to me that a man asked the Messenger of Allah (saw) and said: "O Messenger of Allah, my father entered Islam while he is an old man. If I tie him to my mount, I fear I might kill him, and if I do not tie him, he will not stay firm on it. Shall I perform Hajj for him?" The Messenger of Allah (saw) said: "Do you see that if your father had a debt and you paid it off for him, would that suffice for him?" He said: "Yes." He (saw) said: "Then perform Hajj for your father."
The jurists have spoken about the Hadith, taking into account that Allah (swt) made the obligation of Hajj contingent upon capability:
وَلِلَّهِ عَلَى النَّاسِ حِجُّ الْبَيْتِ مَنِ اسْتَطَاعَ إِلَيْهِ سَبِيلاً
"And [due] to Allah from the people is a pilgrimage to the House - for whoever is able to find thereto a way." (QS. Aal-i-Imran [3]: 97)
Some jurists considered the Hadith of the old man specific to that questioner and not others so that the Hadith does not conflict with the capability mentioned in the verse. As for cases other than that, it is not obligatory for the son to perform Hajj for his incapable father except from the gate of honoring one's parents, considering that the ruling is specific to that questioner, similar to the ruling specific to Abu Burdah regarding the sacrifice of a young goat (Jadh'ah), which Al-Bukhari narrated from Al-Bara' bin 'Azib... Abu Burdah bin Niyar, the maternal uncle of Al-Bara', said: "O Messenger of Allah, we have a young she-goat that is dearer to me than two sheep; will it suffice for me?" He (saw) said: "Yes, and it will not suffice for anyone after you." A Jadh'ah goat does not suffice for sacrifice, but it was specific to Abu Burdah.
What I prefer is reconciling the Hadith and the verse before resorting to specificity, because the original rule is that people are addressed by the rulings, and none of them is turned toward specificity unless a text to that effect is mentioned, such as the case of Abu Burdah and the Messenger's (saw) saying to him: "Yes, and it will not suffice for anyone after you," or if reconciliation is impossible. Here, there is no text for specificity, and reconciliation is not impossible. It is possible to reconcile the verse and the Hadith by saying that Hajj is not obligatory except upon capability in wealth and body. Exempted from that is the case of the son with his father; if the son is capable and the father is incapable, the son must perform Hajj for his father because the Messenger (saw) counted the Hajj for the parent in this case like the debt that the son must pay off for his father.) End quote from the previous answer to the question. That is, the Hadith is not specific to the person of the questioner alone, but it is general, though restricted to the subject of the question alone, i.e., in the case of (the capable son performing Hajj for the incapable father). This is what I prefer in this issue, and Allah is All-Knowing and Most Wise.
I hope the answers above have removed any ambiguity in understanding, Allah willing.
Your brother, Ata Bin Khalil Abu Al-Rashtah
14 Safar al-Khayr 1442 AH 01/10/2020 CE
Link to the answer from the Ameer's page (may Allah protect him) on Facebook