Question:
The Afghan war has lasted nearly 10 years, and America is still mired in its swamp... Obama promised to make the Afghan war a priority and accused the Bush administration of neglecting the real war. Since he came to power and established his strategy against terrorism in Afghanistan, America has appeared contradictory in this strategy. It increases the number of its forces there, but then says that this increase will be withdrawn in the summer of 2011, which harms that strategy. Many officials, including General Petraeus, say the strategy is ineffective, and there are even some news reports saying there is a conflict between the circles of the State Department and the military. What is the extent of America's interest in Afghanistan despite being in this swamp? Is there really a difference between the view of the previous Republican administration and the current Democratic administration? Is Obama serious about the withdrawal plan he set for Afghanistan, despite what is heard about disagreements between him and his commanders? Is there a role for neighboring countries, especially after Europe's "restlessness" with this war and the leaked plans for withdrawal? What is expected in this matter?
Answer:
1- Let us start with some opinions of American political analysts regarding this region, which is part of the historical Eurasian region that extends from East Asia through Central Asia and its surroundings, penetrating Europe... Zbigniew Brzezinski said of that region that it is "home to most of the world's politically active and dynamic states, and all the historical pretenders to global power originated in Eurasia. The world's most populous aspirants to regional hegemony, China and India, are in Eurasia, as are all the potential political and economic challengers to American primacy. After the United States, the next six largest economies and the next six biggest spenders on military weaponry are located in Eurasia. All but one of the world's overt nuclear powers are located in Eurasia. Eurasia accounts for about 75 per cent of the world's population, 60 per cent of its GNP, and 75 per cent of its energy resources. Collectively, Eurasia's potential power overshadows even America's. Eurasia is the world's axial supercontinent. A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world's three most advanced and economically productive regions... Western Europe and East Asia... and would automatically control the Middle East and Africa. Thus, what happens to the distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive importance to America's global primacy and its historical legacy." [A Geostrategy for Eurasia, Foreign Affairs, September/October 1997].
George Friedman said in his book [The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century - 2009]: "The United States has a fundamental interest in preventing any single power from dominating Eurasia... The irony of American interests, however they are packaged in political rhetoric, is that preventing the emergence of such a power is more important to it than introducing its own power! Therefore, its policy in regions open to another potential power is to spread instability, unrest, and disturbances, and to place obstacles to prevent that power from rising... This explains America's actions towards the rising Islamic earthquake by stirring up instability in the Islamic region to prevent the establishment of a large, powerful Islamic state... Thus, it is not in America's interest to bring peace to Eurasia... It is also not in its interest to 'win' in the region as much as it is in its interest to prevent stability therein to forestall the emergence of a superpower that competes with it. Its primary concern is destabilizing the region rather than stabilizing the regime."
2- The region that forms a pivotal part of Eurasia is Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and western Iran. Therefore, it is not surprising that successive governments in the United States, regardless of their ideological leanings (Neoconservatives or Realists), have focused on using Afghanistan and Pakistan in the United States' project to consolidate American hegemony over the region. In fact, the use of Afghanistan and Pakistan to defeat the Soviet Union is still stuck in the minds of policymakers in the United States. In a recent interview, Brzezinski admitted that Afghanistan in the 1980s was the battle of superpowers over Eurasia [Russia Today, September 26, 2010]. Therefore, through the suspicious invasion of Afghanistan after the events of September 11, 2001, America sought to secure its strategic objectives, which are summarized as:
- Preventing Russian and Chinese hegemony over Asia and Europe.
- Preventing the emergence of the Khilafah State.
- Controlling oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea and the Middle East.
- Controlling hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea and the Middle East and securing their transport to its vital interests.
There is no disagreement between Republicans and Democrats, or between Neoconservatives and Realists, regarding these goals, nor on the invasion of Afghanistan and the long-term American military presence in the country, or America's exploitation of Afghanistan to destabilize neighboring countries, especially in the former Soviet space. The disagreement centers on operational objectives—that is, America's ability to achieve these strategic goals in the near term, the effectiveness of the central role played by American military power, and the nature of the occupation.
During the Bush era, his administration was completely preoccupied with events in Iraq, which allowed the Taliban to reorganize and spread in Afghanistan. This situation remained until Obama came to the presidency, where he began reviewing the operational strategy in Afghanistan and following new mechanisms to subdue the Pashtun resistance. After reviewing the situation in Afghanistan, Obama settled on the following operational objectives: a- Increasing the ability of the Afghan government to impose its authority over the country, which means building Afghan security forces, police, and army, appointing competent and loyal governors, and reducing corruption in the Afghan government. b- Defeating Al-Qaeda and Pashtun elements opposed to the American occupation. c- Urging moderate Taliban fighters to join the central government. d- Obtaining assistance from Iran, India, Russia, China, and other countries for the United States to participate in solving the Afghan problem in a regional context.
3- Once again, these operational objectives, compared to what they were during the Bush administration, differ only in details. The major differences between them are in the methods used to achieve operational goals—namely, what the size and depth of the American military deployment in Afghanistan should be, and the issue of involving Pakistan in the war. The Bush administration believed that it was possible to achieve operational goals by limiting the size of the American military deployment and gradually prompting Pakistan to participate more heavily in the tribal areas. As for Obama, he adopted a military and electoral policy; on one hand, he worked for greater intervention by the US military, sending more American soldiers to the ground in Afghanistan and forcing Pakistan to play an active role in pursuing the war in the tribal areas. On the other hand, he worked to satisfy American voters with his pledge to reduce the size of American forces in Afghanistan by 2012!
On December 1, 2009, Obama announced, saying: "I am announcing tonight the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops, which will be deployed in the first quarter of 2010 at the fastest possible pace so that they can target insurgents and secure key population centers. These additional forces and American and international forces will give us the opportunity to accelerate the handover of responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin transferring our forces from Afghanistan in July 2011." [VOA News Online]. Thus, the 30,000 additional American soldiers in the summer of 2010 will bring the total number of American soldiers to 100,000. The total number of foreign troops in Afghanistan at present is 150,000, and this figure includes 100,000 American soldiers. As of September 2009, the number of contractors to provide security, transportation, and logistics reached 104,100 in Afghanistan, according to the Ministry of Defense on December 15, 2009. Therefore, the total number of forces under US command is about 250,000. On the Pakistani side of the Afghan border in the tribal area of Pakistan, the number of forces is 140,000 [Al-Fajr Online, February 2, 2010]. This means that the total number of forces fighting the Taliban is approximately 390,000.
4- The withdrawal date has dominated the talk and debate within the Obama administration as well as between Obama and his military machine. Simply put, the military establishment, along with many senior politicians, believes that the operational goals set by Obama cannot be achieved even with the presence of 250,000 soldiers and adherence to the timelines for achieving that. The most prominent victim of the tension between Obama and the military was General McChrystal, who was relieved by Obama of his command of the army in Afghanistan. When Obama relieved him, he said that General Stanley McChrystal's statements represent conduct that affects the administration as it "undermines the civilian control of the military that is at the core of our democratic system." [MSNBC.com, June 23, 2010]. Even after McChrystal was fired, the Pentagon still doubts Obama's withdrawal date from Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Robert Gates gave reassurances to General Petraeus, who replaced McChrystal, and Gates stressed that the withdrawal plan was "based on existing conditions." He said that General David Petraeus agrees with the President's strategy in general when he is on the ground, and said that he would assess the situation himself and communicate his recommendations to the President, which is what any military commander should do, and the President would welcome those recommendations, but ultimately the President will decide if there are changes to be made in this strategy." [CBS News, June 24, 2010].
Last August, another American commander named General James Conway, a commander in the US Marine Corps, also questioned the withdrawal date, saying: "We think right now that probably pointing to a date for our withdrawal will give our enemy heart... and the reality is: 'Hey, we only have to hold out for so long'... I say honestly 'it will be years before the conditions on the ground change in our favor'" [BBC News Online, August 24, 2010].
5- However, the most telling scenes of the rifts between Obama and the military appeared in Bob Woodward's book Obama's Wars, where Woodward said that during repeated meetings to review and evaluate America's strategy in Afghanistan in 2009, the President avoided talking about victory while stating his goals in Afghanistan.
The President said in the White House to justify the reasons that led him to send 30,000 additional troops in a short-term escalatory case, "We need to have a plan for why we are going to Afghanistan and getting out," adding: "Everything we do must focus on how to reach a point that enables us to strengthen our presence, it is in the interest of our national security, and there can be no room for maneuver." He then summarized his words by saying: "I have two years to achieve that." In his last sessions, as the book says, he said: "I want an exit strategy." In a private meeting with Vice President Joseph Biden about an alternative strategy, Obama opposed not increasing the forces, while at the same time setting a timetable for withdrawal! Justifying this by saying that he promised this in his election campaign and said: "I cannot contribute to the loss of the Democratic Party by not implementing promises..." [Obama's Wars, Bob Woodward].
6- Thus, it is clear from the previous statements that President Obama's interest is in returning some American forces to their homes from Afghanistan before the 2012 US elections. At the same time, the US military insists that the withdrawal deadline be extended and strongly opposes Obama's withdrawal plan. The Pentagon views it as extremely dangerous for achieving operational goals. It must also be emphasized that Obama does not intend to withdraw all American forces—meaning all 100,000 soldiers. According to the "Afghanistan Study Group," which recently released a five-point paper titled "A New Way Forward," it recommended in this paper reducing American forces to 68,000 soldiers by October 2011 and 30,000 by July 2012. Such a move would save the United States at least $60 to $80 billion annually to alleviate domestic discontent over America's large military presence. Other studies have called for reducing the number of forces to 50,000. O'Hanlon wrote an article titled "How to Win the War in Afghanistan" in which he believes that Obama will run for re-election with more than 50,000 American troops in Afghanistan [Foreign Affairs, 2010]. This means that America will maintain a significant military presence in Afghanistan to continue its strategic goals at a later date.
7- Conclusion: Obama's insistence on returning troops to America on July 11, 2011, has undermined the United States' ability to achieve its operational goals. With the presence of 100,000 American troops and the setting of a narrow and near withdrawal date, and with Europe's unwillingness to contribute more soldiers, America is trying hard to involve neighboring countries in the problem of Afghanistan. Yesterday, Monday 19/10/2010, America sponsored, through the "International Contact Group on Afghanistan," a conference in Rome that included about 46 countries and international organizations, among which was the Islamic Conference! In fact, Iran attended it for the first time, and Holbrooke, America's delegate, stated that Iran has a role to play in Afghanistan... Furthermore, the US Department of Defense is focusing intensely on forcing Pakistan to deploy a larger number of soldiers in the tribal areas and involving the militants residing there. America needs to limit the ferocity of the Pashtun resistance and win over groups from the Afghan Taliban movement to the Afghan government in order to make the occupation acceptable to the Afghans and reduce the threat to its military presence. However, the Pakistani army's fear of India and its drowning in the flood crisis made it difficult for it to redeploy additional soldiers.
America has increased its attacks on the tribal area by "unmanned aircraft" (drones) in a provocative manner even to its agents in Pakistan. It did not stop at raiding the tribes but also the Pakistani soldiers, which caused embarrassment to the authority, prompting it to close the border pass to Afghanistan through which supplies cross, but for a short time to absorb the people's anger... then it reopened it... Despite the thousands of soldiers that America sent to Afghanistan, and despite the collusion of Pakistan's rulers with America, and with the increase in drone attacks, and with America's attempts to play on the chord of "moderate" and "non-moderate" Taliban, it is still mired in the Afghan swamp... It realizes that it will not be able to maintain its prestige in Afghanistan, or even exit standing on its feet, unless it can win over groups of the Afghan resistance—that is, by replicating the Iraq Sahwa (Awakening) project to transfer it to Afghanistan. It seems that it has not yet succeeded in this matter... Thus, it is regressing from bad to worse.